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UNSTACKING THE DECK? CONTRACT MANIPULATION
AND CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTABILITY
Eric A. Zacks*
This Article examines and critiques the revised legal framework for
interpreting and enforcing consumer credit card agreements under the
federal Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
(CARD) Act of 2009. Credit card issuers have historically prepared
credit card agreements in their favor in a "race to the bottom,"
regardless of regulatory requirements or enforcement mechanisms.
This Article argues that many reforms mandated by the CARD Act
may be ineffective, or at best, incomplete, with respect to creating
effective and informed contracts. Rather than addressing fundamental
flaws in the credit card agreement negotiation context regarding
asymmetries of information, incentives, and resources, the CARD Act
generally attempts to solve problems by relying on passive disclosure
processes that are based on unrealistic assumptions about individual
debtors' likely responses and existing enforcement regimes. Instead,
this Article recommends establishing ex ante default rules and ex post
presumptions of enforceability that align issuers' profit incentives
with the desire for meaningful and timely disclosure of material
contract terms. The contractual regime's flaws could be further
remedied through mechanisms designed to demonstrate and ensure
credit card holders' knowing assent to the initial or amended terms of
credit card agreements. Finally, the limits of the CARD Act could be
addressed through other ex post mechanisms designed to address
contractual issues after they arise, including permitting collective
remedial actions with respect to similarly situated holders. These
solutions are offered not as a perfect antidote to the asymmetries
identified above, which may be structural, but instead as tools to assist
in preventing, as well as providing redress for, outcomes that are
predicated on the exploitation of those same asymmetries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The public outcry over credit card agreements and disclosures has
reached a feverish pitch in recent years. 1 Complaints about hidden fees,
retroactive interest rate changes, and mandatory individual arbitration
clauses have risen, especially in light of the economic struggles of the
past few years.2  These unfavorable contractual features suggest the
need for additional reform to the legal framework governing credit card
agreements.
Traditionally, form contracts such as credit card agreements have
been used to simplify and streamline repeated and repeatable
transactions.3  In the credit card context, financial institutions that issue
credit cards (Issuers) may be entering into agreements with thousands of
consumers seeking to obtain a credit card (Holders). From an Issuer's
viewpoint, it is rational to expend time and resources to ensure that the
credit card agreement meets the Issuer's desires and needs on a mass
scale. From a Holder's viewpoint, however, there are factors and
limitations that make it irrational, unlikely, or, even worse, impossible,
for the Holder to negotiate effectively the credit card agreement. These
factors and limitations, well-known to Issuers, create opportunities that
are exploited to the benefit of Issuers without the knowledge or desire of
Holders.4 This exploitation of asymmetrical information and (generally)
1. See, e.g., Steven Gray & Michael Peltier, Exposing the Credit-Card Fine Print, TIME, Feb.
21, 2008, available at http:www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1715293,00.html ("There has
never been such a spotlight on the [credit card] industry [with respect to issuer practices]" (quoting
Curtis Arnold, founder of CardRatings.com, a website offering credit card guidance)). Gray and Peltier
also find that "[t]he added interest and late fees ... are feeding a consumer backlash that is gaining
strength." Id.; Amy Schatz, White House to Put Credit-Card Rates in Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J., Apr.
20, 2009, at A3; David Lazarus, It's Time To Hold Credit Card Issuers to Account, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2009, at B1; Eileen Ambrose, Card Issuers Become Wary, Leaving Consumers Pinched, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/sns-yourmoney-0916cards,0,4027435.story; see
also Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, A Renewed Federal Focus on Credit Card Disclosures, 61
BUS. LAW. 867, 867 (2006) ("The perception that card issuers-and federally required disclosure
statements-have failed to adequately inform consumers about certain material credit card terms and
conditions has led to increased consumer complaints, criticism of card issuers, and criticism of federal
disclosure rules.").
2. See, e.g., Editorial, The Credit Card Squeeze, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2009, at WK7 ("Many
credit card holders are complaining about unexpected increases in fees or interest rates that double or
triple for no reason."); Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Credit Card Holders Livid About 'Rate-
Jacking', Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/l7/credit.card.rates/index.html; Connie
Prater, Proposed credit card rule changes draw massive response, CREDIT CARDS.COM, Aug. 8, 2008,
http://www.creditcards.con/credit-card-news/unfair-practices-credit-cards-1282.php (noting that the
Federal Reserve Board had received over 56,000 responses (a record response) from banks, credit
unions, credit card users, and advocates to proposed credit card industry regulation).
3. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211,243 (1995).
4. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1373 ("The contract, itself
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resources and other situational factors often results in contracts that are
neither knowingly made nor efficient from the Holder's perspective.
Against this backdrop, the federal Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 was enacted.5 The
CARD Act attempts to address certain flaws of the current contracting
framework by mandating certain disclosures, prohibiting or limiting
certain billing practices or fees, providing time periods during which
consumers may terminate the contractual arrangement following
unfavorable changes to the agreement's provisions, altering the format
of certain disclosures, and restricting credit card agreements with
individuals below a certain age.
This Article contends that many reforms mandated by the CARD Act
may be ineffective, or at best, incomplete, with respect to creating
voluntary knowing contracts. Rather than addressing fundamental flaws
in the credit card agreement context regarding asymmetries of
information, incentives, and resources, the CARD Act generally
attempts to solve problems by relying on passive disclosure processes
that are based on unrealistic assumptions about individual Holders'
likely responses and existing enforcement regimes. Instead, the
contractual regime's flaws could be addressed by establishing ex ante
default rules and ex post presumptions of enforceability that align
Issuers' profit incentives with the desire for meaningful and timely
disclosure of material contract terms. These default rules would be
strengthened further by introducing mechanisms designed to
demonstrate and ensure Holders' knowing assent to the initial or
amended terms of credit card agreements. The limits of the CARD Act
also could be remedied through other ex post mechanisms designed to
address contractual issues after they arise, including permitting
collective remedial actions with respect to similarly situated Holders.
These solutions are offered not as a perfect antidote to the asymmetries
identified above, which may be structural in part, but instead as tools to
assist in preventing, as well as providing redress for, outcomes that are
predicated on the exploitation of those same asymmetries.
Part II of this Article describes generally the "situation" of credit card
agreements prior to the enactment of the CARD Act. Part III then
describes the CARD Act's various provisions and provides a critical
analysis from behavioral, efficiency, and fairness perspectives. Next,
commonly designed by the [Issuer], will be shaped around consumers' systematic deviations from
perfect rationality... [C]ompetitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumers'
weaknesses.").
5. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24,
123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter The CARD Act].
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Part IV suggests various alternatives or complements to the credit card
agreement regime as modified by the CARD Act to remedy existing
asymmetries of information and control with Issuers' profit incentives.
Consequently, these solutions will be designed to address shortcomings
within both the existing regulatory regime as well as the common law
and will address these issues on an ex ante and ex post basis. Lastly,
Part V concludes this Article by suggesting that the CARD Act is flawed
in several aspects and likely will not address the structural flaws within
the credit card agreement regime. Absent additional reforms, such as
those suggested in this Article, Issuers and Holders may continue to
enter into credit card agreements that do not reflect the actual desires of
both parties.
II. THE CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT CONTEXT
It has been suggested that the credit card market is the "perfect
example of a democratized market" involving a "world of contracts of
adhesion, with terms and conditions set by the seller with no realistic
prospective of negotiation."6 Credit card agreements, similar to many
consumer contracts, typically are standard form contracts offered on a
"take it or leave it basis," where the Issuer provides the Holder with a
contract containing all of the business terms with respect to the
transaction with little or no opportunity for negotiation.7
Theoretically, standard form contracts can be beneficial for both
parties by reducing transaction costs, because the time and expense for
negotiation and bargaining will be reduced. 8 For example, Issuers and
Holders will not have to start "from scratch" with respect to every term
contained in a credit card agreement, which may range from payment
terms to choice of venue for disputes. In particular, standard form
contracts that are not subject to negotiation permit sellers to "standardize
their risks and reduce bargaining costs by offering one set of terms to all
consumers." 9 With respect to many Holders who do not carry a balance
from month to month and therefore may not care about the agreement's
terms (because they will never be paying interest or late fees), a
preprinted agreement may reduce the hassle and cost of negotiating such
6. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157,
166-67 (2006).
7. Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics in the
Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 594 (1990); see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 435 (2002).
8. See Meyerson, supra note 7, at 594.
9. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 439.
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terms.
The lack of negotiation, however, may be problematic for those
Holders who lack credit alternatives or do not negotiate as a result of
certain behavioral biases. 10 At least with respect to many subordinate
contract terms (generally other than basic price and payment), locating
alternative sources for the consumer good (such as consumer credit)
"imposes significant additional transaction costs."" For example, a
Holder would have to seek out a different Issuer that uses a different
standard form credit card agreement without losing the benefits of the
current Issuer's interest rate or other terms. Even if there were Holders
whose credit card agreements did not contain a particular unfavorable
contract term, such as a mandatory binding individual arbitration clause
(as discussed in Part III.E, infra), the cost in terms of time and money to
the Holder likely would be significant and definite, while the benefit
may be uncertain (as the Holder would not know, or be able to estimate
accurately, the likelihood of a dispute in the future). 12
Moreover, certain behavioral biases suggest that Holders will not
negotiate such terms even in the absence of such transaction costs. One
such bias is the status quo bias, which is the general preference of
individuals for the status quo even in the absence of an efficient
allocation of rights (i.e., what the individuals would have bargained for
absent the status quo). 13 In this context, the status quo bias suggests that
Holders, upon receipt of the credit card agreement, presumably through
the mail, will believe that the credit card agreement represents the status
quo and, consequently, are unlikely to challenge its provisions. 14  In
particular, it has been suggested that the agreement's appearance as a
formal legal contract will "induce deference."' 15 The status quo bias is
further reinforced to the extent that a Holder would likely encounter
resistance to change with respect to any attempted negotiations with an
Issuer's agent. For example, if a Holder contacted an Issuer customer
service representative over the telephone to negotiate a particular
contractual term, the Issuer's representative would likely inform the
10. See also Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 361-62 (2003) (noting that "[c]onsumers and investors
not only think that adhesion contracts are generally nonnegotiable, they are correct (practically
speaking) in so thinking.").
11. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 600.
12. See id.
13. See Prentice, supra note 10, at 371.
14. Id. at 372.
15. Id. But see Meyerson, supra note 7, at 595 (suggesting that "consumers are well able to
determine the subjective value of such purchases and can find a different seller, or forego a particular
purchase altogether, if the deal is not perceived to be in their best interest.").
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Holder that the representative could not by herself change the term and
that an exception was unlikely.' 6 Compounding the issue in this context
is that, unlike in many consumer sales contexts, no sales representative
typically is present when the Holder is considering the credit card
agreement, because it is often received through the mail.
In addition to the status quo bias, social proof, or "the notion that
people in a particular situation tend to take their cues for correct
behavior from others they observe," suggests that Holders will be
reluctant to negotiate a credit card agreements' provisions because they
perceive very few people attempting to do so. 17  The tendency to
experience more regret from negative situations resulting from actions
an individual takes rather than inaction also may explain Holders'
reluctance to negotiate credit card agreements.' 8  In other words,
Holders may prefer to end up in a negative situation with respect to
credit card debt as a result of having not acted, than attempting to
negotiate the credit card agreement. '9
Beyond the lack of negotiation or negotiability of standard form
contracts, many consumers do not read such contracts at all. 20  For
example, borrowers typically "do not know the range of collection
remedies available to the creditor, the myriad events that could trigger
foreclosure, or that they must pay the creditor's legal fees for collection
procedures, but cannot recover their own fees even if they are successful
in litigation."'
It also may be in Issuers' best interest to prepare credit card
agreements that obscure, rather than disclose, the material terms of the
credit card agreement. Generally, it is rational for the party with the
most knowledge to prepare contract terms that shift the risk to the party
16. Prentice, supra note 10, at 372. Prentice expects that most "form takers" would "likely give
up after being told that the agent had no authority to alter [the form contracts], that the forms came from
the lawyers and could not be changed, or that an exception could not be made just for this particular
investor [consumer]." Id. at 372-73.
17. Id. at 372-73.
18. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism ", 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1224 (2003) (describing the "tendency [of
individuals] to care much more about errors of commission than about errors of omission, even when
there is no obvious normative reason to draw a distinction."); see also Prentice, supra note 10, at 376.
19. Prentice, supra note 10, at 376-7 (citing Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998), where Professor Korobkin described
experiments demonstrating that law students selected default or alternate contract terms based on
whether an affirmative act or choice was required).
20. Prentice, supra note 10, at 358-62; see also Michael 1. Meyerson, The Reunification of
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1269
(1993) (asserting that "[i]t is no secret that consumers neither read nor understand standard form
contracts.").
2 1. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 595-96.
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lacking the knowledge to evaluate the cost of the risk.22 In this instance,
one would expect financial institutions, as profit-maximizing entities, to
prepare or furnish contracts that preclude or hamper Holders' ability to
evaluate the risks and costs of various agreement terms. If Holders are
unable to evaluate the costs because of knowledge asymmetries created
or exploited by Issuers (as well as behavioral biases), then they will
over-borrow or otherwise enter into agreements containing higher
interest rates or other unfavorable contractual provisions without
properly evaluating the negative costs associated with such agreements.
In the credit card agreement context, Issuers have in fact prepared
agreements that are heavily tilted in their favor.23 For example, Issuers
often include contractual provisions that permit them to charge penalty
or increased interest rates with respect to purchases that have already
been made or (sometimes) already discharged.24 In addition, Issuers
typically reserve the right to increase interest rates because of a Holder's
credit issues (such as late payments with other lenders or creditors) or
for no reason at all.25 Certain Issuers also have used questionable billing
practices such as "double-cycle billing," which is when Issuers consider
the outstanding balance for two billing cycles in assessing interest for
the current month, or applying Holder payments towards the lowest
22. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 605.
23. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1373 ("Absent legal intervention, the sophisticated seller will often
exploit the consumer's behavioral biases. The contract itself, commonly designed by the seller, will be
shaped around consumers' systematic deviations from perfect rationality .... This broad theme is
developed within a detailed case study of the credit card market and the credit card contract."); see also
Meyerson, supra note 7, at 595.
24. See JOINT ECON. COMM., Vicious CYCLE: How UNFAIR CREDIT CARD PRACTICES ARE
SQUEEZING CONSUMERS AND UNDERMINING THE RECOVERY 9 (2009) [hereinafter VICIOUS CYCLE],
http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&Fileid=42840b23-fed8-447b-a029-e977c0a25544 ("Credit
card companies have the incentive to include provisions to increase interest rates on existing balances
because the debt held by credit cardholders is not secured by any underlying assets."); see also H.R. 627,
The Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights of 2009; and HR. 1456, The Consumer Overdraft Protection
Fair Practices Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., lllth Cong. 161 (2009) (statement of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Dir.,
Consumer Fed'n of Am.) [hereinafter Plunkett Statement] (noting that "[t]he primary effect of a punitive
retroactive rate increase appears to be to escalate the proportion of the consumer's debt owed to the card
issuer").
25. See JOSHUA M. FRANK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PRICELESS OR JUST EXPENSIVE?
THE USE OF PENALTY RATES IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 4 (2008) [hereinafter FRANK],
http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-analysis/priceless-or-just-expensive.pdf (noting
that critics have asserted that issuers "want their customers to turn into these higher risk borrowers with
few options because they can charge higher rates, yet do not need to be concerned about the customer
leaving for a competitor"); Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of
Repair, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 39 (2006) (noting Issuer use of universal default provisions
designed to leave "consumers stuck to pay often high balances at interest rates far higher than was
originally agreed, with devastating consequences"); see also Plunkett Statement, supra note 24, at 162.
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applicable interest rate debt.2 6 Perhaps the most alarming feature of
credit card agreements is the Issuer's ability to change the credit card
agreement's provisions and terms for any (or no) reason and at any
time.27
Current weaknesses in the disclosures contained in or accompanying
credit card agreements also suggest that Issuers prepare such agreements
in their favor in an attempt to maximize profits. 28  These weaknesses
include an unreasonable reading level required to understand the
disclosures and contractual provisions, inadequate presentation of
information, and excessive detail and length.29 One report found that
comprehending most credit card agreements would require a twelfth-
grade education, while approximately half of the U.S. population reads
at about the eighth-grade level. 30  In addition, important information for
credit card disclosures is frequently placed at the end of sentences or
otherwise is unorganized. 31 Formatting weaknesses, such as using tiny
font, footnotes, improper emphasis on certain words or terms, and
confusing headings, also can encumber comprehension of many credit
card agreements and disclosures. 32  Finally, the complexity of credit
card disclosure documents, such as the use of unfamiliar or complex
terms to describe simple concepts and inclusion of irrelevant detail,
make it difficult and labor-intensive for a Holder to understand what she
is signing.33
26. Plunkett Statement, supra note 24, at 163 ("A consumer who begins with no balance and
pays off most but not all of the purchases he or she makes in the first month would still be charged
interest for the entire amount of the balance in the second month." (emphasis omitted)); Carter et al.,
supra note 25, at 42 (describing Issuer practices to allocate payments to account balances with the
lowest interest rates). Issuers also typically include "ridiculously early" payment cut-off times for
crediting payments received on a particular day. Id. at 43.
27. Carter et al., supra note 25, at 42 (describing Issuer practices to raise interest rates "through
change-in-terms notices and use penalty fees with punitive late payment and over-limit policies to
subsequently entrap consumers."); Plunkett Statement, supra note 24, at 162.
28. Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Credit Card Practices, OCC
Advisory Letter No. AL 2004-10 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc (cautioning national banks regarding current
misleading or poor disclosure practices in credit card marketing and agreements).
29. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES
AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 33 (2006) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf.
30. Id. at 37 (consequently concluding that the "disclosure documents provided to many
cardholders likely were written at a level too high for the average individual to understand").
31. See Carter et al., supra note 25, (noting weaknesses in disclosures regarding "universal
default" credit card agreement provisions); GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
32. GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 41, 42-45 (detailing how formatting weaknesses "likely
reduce[] the usefulness of typical credit card disclosure documents.").
33. Id. at 46; see also Prentice, supra note 10, at 372 (discussing the effect of the legal
appearance of consumer contracts on consumers).
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It has been suggested that Issuers choose to prepare their agreements
in the manner described above deliberately to minimize potential legal
liability.34 For example, using simple language may raise the risk that a
Holder will misinterpret a particular provision. 35  The lengthier
disclosures also may be responses to court decisions or current
regulatory guidance. 36 The most compelling argument, however, is that
Issuers, responding to their incentive to maximize profit, prepare credit
card agreements and disclosures that are "loaded with booby traps
designed to trip consumers, and written in intentionally impenetrable
and confusing language."
37
Despite the publicity of credit card agreement "abuses," it should be
noted that credit card debt is not dangerous for much of the population.38
The group that is likely to suffer the most from abusive credit card
practices, however, is comprised of individuals in a poor position to
address or remedy them.39  This suggests that any reforms should be
specifically tailored to addressing the costs suffered by the subset of the
population that suffers from the costs of over-borrowing without
unreasonably interfering with the use of credit cards by the balance of
the population who do not suffer similarly. 40
III. THE CARD ACT'S REFORMS
The CARD Act introduces many reforms into the credit card
agreement legal framework, which range widely from reliance on
substantial government enforcement of enhanced restrictions or new
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 51.
35. Id. at 51-52.
36. Id. at 52. Interestingly, the GAO report does not identify the likely primary reason for
inadequate disclosure, namely, the profit incentive of Issuers in the context of standard form contracting.
37. Id. at 46 (quoting an unnamed consumer).
38. Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in
Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733, 780, 786 (2009)
(noting that "[m]uch but not all of this [credit card] debt is benign .... Only half of credit card users
carry any balance on their credit cards. Among them, few get into deep trouble." (footnote omitted)).
But see FRANK, supra note 25, at 5 (reporting that, based on survey results, over 10% of all outstanding
credit card balances are priced at a "penalty" rate, and that over 50% of Holders being charged penalty
rates are unaware of it).
39. Plunkett Statement, supra note 24, at 161 (noting that individuals earning under $50,000
annually were significantly more likely to be charged "penalty" interest rates than higher-income
individuals with credit card debt). There also is evidence that certain Issuers have targeted subprime
Holders with additional credit card solicitations, even as general economic conditions worsened. Id. at
157, 164.
40. Williams, supra note 38, at 741 ("Policymakers need to be especially cognizant of the
collateral costs that regulations might impose on the bulk of consumers who do not experience high
costs from credit card debt.").
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prohibitions ("hard" or "strong" paternalism) to mechanisms designed to
encourage more efficient behavior without significant government
involvement ("soft" or "weak" paternalism). 41 As described below, the
CARD Act prohibits or severely restricts certain practices while in other
areas institutes mechanisms intended to permit and encourage individual
Holders to become aware of material terms of the credit card agreements
or Issuer practices.42 The effectiveness of each of these reforms is
analyzed in light of market as well as behavioral and equitable insights.
A. Increased Disclosure
The CARD Act heavily relies on increased disclosure to Holders to
address the information asymmetries detailed above. For example,
Issuers are required to include in monthly credit statements warnings
that making only the minimum payment will increase the amount of
interest paid and the amount of time to repay the balance.43 Statements
must also include repayment information that sets forth the number of
months it would take to pay off the current balance if only the minimum
payment is made and the monthly payment amount that would be
required to eliminate the current balance within three years.44 Such
disclosure, however, occurs after the debt already has been incurred and
a contract already is in effect.
This subpart focuses on the CARD Act's ex ante disclosure
requirement with respect to "teaser rates," which are low rates offered
for a set period of time as an inducement to credit card holders to sign
up for and use a particular credit card.45 After the "teaser" period,
however, the interest rate may be increased, including with respect to
any existing balance at the end of such period. Under the CARD Act,
"teaser rates" are not prohibited so long as certain requirements are met.
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 249 (2006); see
also Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 167 ("In effect, soft paternalism searches for mechanisms
to improve decisionmaking without having the state assume responsibility for all decisions, most
typically on a one-size-fits-all basis.")
42. It should be noted that this Article generally does not examine or compare the CARD Act to
federal rules promulgated in December 2008 by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury, and National Credit Union Administration. See Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices, 74 Fed Reg. 5,498 (Jan. 29, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 227, 535,
706) [hereinafter Federal Rules].
43. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 201(a).
44. Id. These statements assume that no further advances are made. The statements also must
include the total cost to the consumer (interest and principal) if only minimum payments were made
until the total balance was paid as well as a toll-free telephone number offering access to credit
counseling and debt management services. Id.
45. Id. § 101(b).
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First, prior to the commencement of the applicable borrowing period
containing the teaser rate (which may be increased retroactively at the
end of the teaser period), the Holder must be informed "in a clear and
conspicuous manner" the length and the interest rate that would apply
after expiration of the teaser period.46 Any increases in the teaser rate
also may not be increased with respect to transactions that occurred prior
to the teaser period.47 In addition, "promotional" rates may not be
increased prior to the end of the six-month period after the promotional
rate has taken effect.48
The CARD Act does not introduce a separate mechanism providing
for any separate volitional act demonstrating acknowledgment or
agreement on the part of the Holder regarding the changes to the rate,
other than the Holder's general agreement to the terms and conditions of
the credit card agreement (or by the Holder's actual use of the card
during the teaser period). In addition, the CARD Act relies on outside
parties, namely, regulatory enforcement agencies, to ensure that the
disclosure standards (e.g., the "clear and conspicuous" standard) are
met. 49 The CARD Act's teaser rate reform apparently is based on the
premise that additional disclosure in these circumstances will result in
contracts with terms that have been fully disclosed to, and
comprehended by, Holders. Consequently, it must be determined
whether disclosure alone, even if provided in a "clear and conspicuous"
manner, will result in such comprehension.
At first blush, this provision appears to address concerns about
ensuring that Holders understand and comprehend the terms of their
credit card agreement before signing up for the card. Holders will be
informed, prior to borrowing, that the initial rate may be increased at a
later date, and the initial rate generally cannot be increased until the
teaser rate has been in effect for at least six months, presumably to give
Holders sufficient time to discharge any of their debts. 50 The context of
credit card disclosures and standard form contracts, however, suggests
that disclosure alone does not result in better comprehension or
"agreements," from the viewpoint of the Holder regarding the terms of
the credit card agreement. 51
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 101(d).
49. See Part 11I.E infra.
50. Generally, the CARD Act restricts rate increases during the first year of an account being
opened, but a "teaser rate" exception applies. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 172(a).
51. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 38, at 782 (concluding, based on a recent study regarding the
efficacy of providing additional credit card disclosures or warnings, that "most people either did not
read, or did not understand, these warnings"); Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 167 (concluding
20101 1481
1482 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.78
First, individual Holders are subject to fundamental biases that may
prevent them from accurately internalizing the risks associated with the
teaser rate even when there is clear disclosure. In addition to the biases
that may prevent negotiation, such as the status quo bias discussed in
Part II, supra, Holders generally are overoptimistic and overconfident,
which results in consumers underestimating risk.52 In the credit card
context, this bias likely results in Holders borrowing too much at a given
interest rate.53 This bias is especially compounded when a teaser rate
applies, because a Holder is being asked to assess the risk that she will
have a balance at the end of the teaser rate period (in the future), which
would then be subject to the default (non-teaser) rate.54 The general
inability of individuals to calculate probabilities and general tendency to
discount the risk of negative events that may not happen for some period
of time also suggest that Holders will be unable to determine accurately
the likelihood of the default interest rate's application to a balance at the
end of the teaser rate period. 55
As a result, there is little assurance at the outset that Holders will
understand the new disclosures or even read them when provided. In
that disclosure is unlikely to be sufficient to address market manipulation).
52. Prentice, supra note 10, at 362; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 657-58 (1999)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously] (concluding that "it seems that the
optimistic bias is an indiscriminate and indefatigable cognitive feature, causing individuals to
underestimate the extent to which a threat applies to them even when they can recognize the severity it
poses to others"); Williams, supra note 38, at 783 (asserting that Holders' "nominal control" over credit
card use and debt repayment "fosters overconfidence and probably leads at least a subset of credit card
consumers to accrue more debt than they originally intended").
53. Williams, supra note 38, at 780 ("Most people who accrue credit card debt are not happy
about it. In short, many people regret their choices to incur debt." (footnote omitted)). Williams
suggests that Holders may accrue too much credit card debt either because they cannot calculate
accurately how quickly the debt will increase over time or because they are unable to accurately predict
the amount they will borrow and be able to repay in the future. Id. at 781. Williams concludes that the
former explanation suggests that better disclosure of the costs of borrowing will alleviate over-optimism
and suggests such disclosures have been ineffective. Id. On the other hand, the explanation regarding
the inability of individuals to predict their future borrowing and repayment behavior suggests the
existence of "sticky expectations," or an optimism bias that is strongly resistant to change. Id. at 734,
782. If the optimism bias is due to "sticky expectations," then simply providing more factual
information is unlikely to be effective since the over-borrowing is not a reaction to errors regarding
objective facts. Others have focused on other reasons for over-borrowing. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 41, at 251-53 (listing cumulative cost neglect, procrastination, myopia, self-control problems, and
"miswanting" as potential explanations for over-borrowing).
54. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1392. ("Despite the fact that most borrowing is done at the high
post-promotion rates, consumers appear to be extremely sensitive to teaser rates."). Another
manifestation of the optimism bias may be that Holders believe that their credit card agreement
(including the teaser rate provisions) contain better terms from the Holders' perspective than they
actually do. See Prentice, supra note 10, at 363 (noting that consumers tend to believe "that the terms of
their contracts are more favorable to them than they actually are").
55. Prentice, supra note 10, at 363-64.
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addition, the teaser rate provisions also do not require specific disclosure
that the increased rate would apply to balances outstanding as of the end
of the teaser period, which suggests that even more Holder confusion
may result. 56  As discussed above, even to the extent that such
disclosures are objectively clear and complete, Holder behavior suggests
that disclosure alone will not reduce credit card over-borrowing or
overuse.
It also is not clear that Issuers would provide meaningful disclosure in
this context, despite the new requirements. As noted above, the CARD
Act requires disclosure of the teaser rate and the teaser rate period in a
"clear and conspicuous manner." A "clear disclosure," however, could
be buried within or accompanied by several other lengthy and complex
credit card disclosure documents.57 Setting aside the concerns about
enforcement of the disclosure requirements (discussed in Part III.E,
infra), an important factor in determining whether the requirements will
be met is the Issuers' incentive in these circumstances.
Issuers generate significant revenue by charging interest and fees with
respect to credit cards to Holders (as well as by charging merchants for
accepting their credit cards at the merchants' establishments).58 For
example, Issuers do not realize any interest from a Holder who does not
carry a balance from month to month. As a result, Issuers logically seek
Holders who will carry a balance, subject to concerns about the Holder's
ultimate ability to repay. Thus, in the context of teaser rates, it is in
Issuers' rational interest to seek Holders who will not pay off their
balance by the time that the new increased rate is imposed.59 In
particular, one would expect Issuers to prepare credit card agreements
that do not reveal to the Holder the risks associated with using the
particular credit card, including making adequate disclosures regarding
the teaser rate; as seen above, empirical data supports this thesis.
If credit card agreements do not sufficiently disclose rate information,
Holders may spend (borrow) too much at a given teaser rate because
they have not understood or evaluated properly the costs or risks
56. This problem is likely solved by federal rules enacted at the end of 2008 which requires
financial institutions to disclose the interest rate that will apply to each category of transactions charged
to a credit card account. See Federal Rules, supra note 42.
57. See discussion regarding the weaknesses of current credit card agreement disclosures in Part
11, supra.
58. Robin Sidel, Card Firms' Loss Tally: Billions of Dollars in Fees, WALL ST. J., May 25,
2009, at A2 1.
59. Gray & Peltier, supra note I ("The credit card industry doesn't really want you to pay off
your debt .... It's like a sweat box. They want you in there as long as possible." (quoting Adam J.
Levitin, a law professor at Georgetown University)); see also Sidel, supra note 58 (reporting that
subprime customers (typically borrowers with credit scores of less than 600) represent almost one third
of the portfolios at Bank of America, CitiGroup and Capital One Finance Corp.).
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involved. This has been labeled the "quantity effect." 60  In the product
liability context, the impact of the quantity effect, where the costs or
risks of injury is a cost that ultimately will be borne by the consumer or
the seller, there is no additional benefit to the seller of the injury actually
occurring (besides the obvious and significant benefit of consumers
purchasing too much of a given product and the seller not paying for the
cost).61  In fact, the injury occurring may have adverse market
consequences for a seller, as the seller's reputation may be harmed. In
the consumer credit card context, however, the Issuers receive all of the
benefits of the "injury" of increases in interest rates. Thus, the product
risks are the risks to the Holder of nonpayment and the resulting
increased default interest rate on the balance of the debt. The inability
of Holders to accurately assess the risks (because of contractual
language or otherwise) results in additional income to Issuers. The
"quantity effect," or borrowing too much at the teaser rate prior to the
expiration of the teaser rate, in this instance is a very desirable end for
Issuers. 
62
Compounding the quantity effect is the "quality effect." The "quality
effect" occurs in the contract context when the party with more
bargaining power is not incentivized to improve the product because
uniformed consumers will not compensate sellers for doing so. 63  In
other contexts, it has been argued that sellers with superior bargaining
power would actually be better off by preparing contracts that better
address consumer demands at a slightly higher price charged to the
60. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 603.
61. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, supra note 52, at 724 (suggesting
that, in the product liability context, "it is in the manufacturer's interest for consumers to have the lowest
estimate of product risks possible: The lower the consumer's risk estimate, the more consumers will be
willing to pay for the product, leading to greater sales and increased profits for manufacturers"). It
should be noted that, although others have examined the actions of sellers outside the contract context to
determine whether buyer's perceptions of risk are manipulated by sellers, this Article does not generally
examine any noncontractual market actions taken by Issuers with respect to Holders and credit card
agreements. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation] (describing the manipulation of consumer cognitive biases by market
sellers to lower consumer perceptions of product risk). One would expect, however, that many of the
same concerns identified by Hanson and Kysar would be raised in this context, especially given that the
risks of additional borrowing costs (such as higher interest rates or penalty fees) are beneficial to Issuers
(as opposed to the product liability context, where the seller is merely able to externalize the cost of
injury by shifting the risk to the consumer). Similarly, one would expect the advertising and marketing
practices of credit card companies to manipulate consumer perceptions (e.g., the "No-Hassle Card") to
reinforce the "status quo" of credit card agreements.
62. Of course, there are other risks to be allocated, such as fee-shifting provisions in the event of
dispute, and businesses are similarly incentivized in that situation to "impose hidden risks on consumers
where possible." Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 440.
63. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 603.
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consumer. 64 For example, one could imagine credit card issuers that
provide simple, complete disclosure regarding teaser rates also charging
a slightly higher teaser rate (or slightly higher rate at the end of the
teaser period) for any cost of the better disclosure (such as less
borrowing). If clear disclosure of the rate adjustment is viewed as a
contract "term," then one would expect an Issuer with an obscure
adjustment rate mechanism to receive more business than an Issuer with
a clear adjustment rate mechanism and a higher interest rate for the
teaser or adjusted rate.65 If credit card holders are not aware of the
"term" to be disclosed, then they cannot have a preference for such
"disclosure," and one should expect Issuers to act accordingly.6 6 In this
context, then, if certain Issuers decided to disclose fully and effectively
the increased rate being applied to the outstanding balance, it is doubtful
that Holders would compensate those financial institutions for providing
such disclosure (i.e., for improving their "level of care") and the same
Issuers actually would face the likelihood of Holders declining to sign
up for that particular credit card (and choosing to sign credit card
agreements with teaser rates that do not include this particular piece of
information).67 Again, in this area, the costs and risks of the contracting
parties are inextricably tied in the sense that a cost to Holders is a
corresponding benefit to Issuers.
These effects, in turn, suggest that Issuers will do the minimum
required to meet the requirements of the CARD Act, which means that
Issuers will likely omit any relevant information not specifically
mandated by the CARD Act (such as the fact that any increases to the
teaser rate will be applied to all outstanding balances). Correspondingly,
Issuers will also likely minimize the "clear and conspicuous"
requirement for disclosure of any increases to the teaser rate by
continued presentation techniques that, although potentially permitted by
64. Id. at 607.
65. Similarly, it has been argued that competitive pressures force Issuers to interest rates and
other "long-term, borrowing-contingent elements of the credit card price" above the marginal cost and
price below marginal cost with respect to "short-term, non-contingent elements (such as teaser rates),
because consumers underestimate the risk and costs of future borrowing." Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at
1376 ("Issuers that do not take advantage of the underestimation bias, and offer lower interest rates
instead of short-term perks, would not succeed in the marketplace.").
66. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 608.
67. In a similar vein, the lack of compensation to Issuers to provide better "boilerplate" terms in
credit card agreements may result in such Issuers reducing the "quality" of their agreements to avoid
losing potential customers to other Issuers. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 244 (suggesting that "[i]f, as
a result of imperfect information, the market price of a product is low because of the product's perceived
low quality, high-quality producers must lower quality to ensure that they will turn a profit at the low
market price. As applied to form contracts, this means that competition may actually degrade preprinted
terms that involve nonsalient risks.").
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the CARD Act, will ensure that many Holders will continue not to read
or comprehend their credit card agreements and disclosures. If credit
card agreements continue to be lengthy, complex, unnecessarily
detailed, and poorly presented, then the effectiveness of even
particularly clear disclosures will be reduced as well. In any event, the
general ineffectiveness of disclosure alone in the credit card agreement
context suggests that many credit card holders will not read or fully
understand the teaser rate provisions. 68  The CARD Act's failure to
address Issuers' fundamental incentives and Borrowers' disclosure
disposition and comprehension is significant and may result in
insufficient disclosure and inferior contracts. This obfuscation will be
compounded, and the intent of the overall reform hampered, by the lack
of sufficient ex post mechanisms to remedy any failure by Issuer to meet
the "clear and conspicuous" disclosure requirements discussed in Part
III.E, infra.
B. Increased Disclosure Plus a Termination Option
The CARD Act uses a similar approach with respect to prospective
increases in interest rates on consumer credit cards as with teaser rates.
The CARD Act requires forty-five days' advance written notice, in a
"clear and conspicuous manner," of any increase in an interest rate or
any other "significant change," as determined by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board).69 The notice must
also disclose the Holder's right to cancel the account before the date of
the rate increase or significant change.70 In addition, the choice by a
Holder to terminate the account may not constitute a default, trigger a
penalty or fee, including any obligation to repay immediately any
outstanding balance, except that the Issuer may require the credit card
holder to repay the outstanding balance using an "approved" repayment
method.7'
As with teaser rate reforms, where the Holder now theoretically will
have available all pertinent information prior to contracting for the teaser
rate, the CARD Act also requires that the Holder have all relevant
information regarding a proposed agreement modification prior to the
effective date of the new contract term. In other words, if the Issuer has
68. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 260-61 (noting that "[i~f borrowers are both myopic and
excessively optimistic, there is a serious risk that purely informational responses will do little or
nothing").
69. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 101(a)(l)(i)(I)-(2).
70. Id. § 101(a)(l)(i)(3).
71. Id. § 101(a)(1)(i)(4). See discussion of approved repayment methods in Part I.D, infra.
CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTABILITY
evidenced its desire to amend the agreement such that the new interest
rate no longer is what was initially agreed to by the parties, then the
Holder has been granted the right either to accept the proposed
amendment or to terminate the current agreement.
Combined with the CARD Act's prohibition on retroactive rate
increases on outstanding balances, 72 the restriction above appears to
address many concerns about the unilateral approach to consumer credit
card agreements previously used by financial institutions. Under prior
practice, Issuers could correct their underwriting "mistakes" by
unilaterally increasing interest rates without notification and applying
these rates retroactively; the rights to do so were included in the initial
credit card agreements. These reservations of rights are premised on
Holders' contracting ex ante bias towards over-optimism, as described
above, whereby Holders underestimate the likelihood that any rates
would ever be increased in the future or that any default would occur.
The CARD Act addresses the biases that Holders may have at the
outset of a credit card arrangement by permitting borrowers to react (by
terminating the credit card arrangement) at the time of the rate increase
and determine whether the contract, as amended, is desirable at the new
rate. This approach also addresses Issuers' concerns about changed risk
profiles for credit card consumers. If a Holder's credit risk profile has
changed and the Issuer determines that it needs additional compensation
to extend credit (i.e., by charging a higher interest rate), then the Issuer
may propose new terms at that time, subject to the Holder's desire to
terminate.
This approach is premised on a number of troublesome assumptions.
First, it assumes that the notice will be sufficient to inform Holders and
that Holders, if they have not opted out, have actually provided assent to
the pending rate increase. With respect to the former assumption,
because of limited ex post mechanisms to enforce the standard of
disclosure and the troublesome limitations of disclosure in the context, it
is doubtful that the new disclosures will communicate effectively the
increased rate and the Holders' rights to terminate the account. 74  In
somewhat counterintuitive fashion, the CARD Act relies on Holders to
respond to notice from the very Issuers who benefit from the Holders
failing to act in response to such notice. With respect to the latter
72. See Part 1Il.D, infra.
73. See FRANK, supra note 25, at 8; see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 453
(providing evidence that people male "inferences consistent with what they want to believe" and
therefore interpret a form contract as containing more favorable terms that may otherwise exist because
the consumer's motivation to consummate the transaction).
74. For example, Holders may prefer not to act as a result of their preference for inaction rather
than action.
2010] 1487
1488 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.78
assumption, it is at best questionable whether Holders' lack of action to
terminate an account following notice of an interest rate increase
signifies actual consent, and at worst indicates that the disclosure was
not effectively communicated to Holders (if they read the notice at all)
or that the Holders are not in a position to terminate the credit card
account and obtain alternative lending at the time that the rate has been
increased. 75
These faulty assumptions suggest that financial institutions' methods
of disclosure with respect to pending rate increases will be incomplete
and not as effective as they might of otherwise have been. As suggested
in Part IV, infra and as included on a limited basis in the CARD Act
with respect to certain penalty fees (discussed in Part III.C, infra),
Holders would be better served by a regime that provides financial
institutions with incentives to share the pending contract change
information as effectively as possible.
C. Increased Disclosure Plus an Opt-In Requirement
The CARD Act uses an innovative approach with respect to "over-
the-limit" transaction fees by combining increased disclosures with the
additional requirement for the express assent of Holder.76 These fees
are charged when a Holder exceeds the Holder's credit limit for a
particular account. Under the applicable provisions of the CARD Act,
no over-the-limit fee may be charged unless the Holder "has expressly
elected" to allow the applicable financial institution to complete over-
the-limit transactions.77 Any election must be preceded by disclosure
from the Issuer of any over-the-limit fee, and the Board will determine
the form, manner, and timing for delivery of such disclosure. 78 Any
election will be effective until revoked, and revocation may be provided
orally, electronically, or in writing, and the option to revoke must be
disclosed to Holders in any periodic statement that includes notice of the
fee being charged for that period.79 The CARD Act also instructs the
Board to regulate the form of election and revocation. 80
The effectiveness of this reform will likely hinge on the required form
75. FRANK, supra note 25, at 8 (Issuers' ability to modify interest rates to penalty rates
"strategically raises the prices on consumers precisely when they are least able to switch to a lower rate
competitor.").
76. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 102(a). The CARD Act also restricts how often "over-the-






and timing of the election. If the Board permits one-time disclosure of
any over-the-limit fees or the Holder's election to accept such fees to
occur up front or months or years in advance, then the utility of these
provisions will be substantially compromised because the Holder will
often be unable to assess accurately the likelihood of incurring a fee in
the future. 8' More problematically, if the form of election may be
manipulated or obfuscated to the detriment of the Holders, then Issuers
will take advantage of the "one-time" requirement for disclosure and
election to secure the Holders' elections.
82
If the Board requires disclosure of any over-the-limit fee
contemporaneously with any over-the-limit transaction and required
consent forms (that may not be disguisable or otherwise manipulated by
financial institutions) or enforceable standards for a Holder's affirmative
election for over-the-limit transactions, then these provisions may create
an effective regime for agreements regarding these fees. The closer in
time to the potential charge, the more effective the notice in ensuring
that the Holder recognizes the reality of the pending charge. In addition,
and more importantly, the requirement for Issuers to receive the
affirmative unmanipulated election of the credit card customers means
that the Issuers will be incentivized to make sure that the credit card
customer has received effective notice of the charge and makes the
election.
This provision is subject to criticism that, even if disclosure is made
contemporaneously with a pending over-the-limit transaction, Holders
forced to make such decisions may not actually have a "decision" to
make. That is, if credit card holders are potentially over their credit
limit and have no other way to pay for the necessities, then the decision
will rationally be made to accept the fee. This concern is partially
addressed by the CARD Act's requirement for such fees to be
"reasonable and proportional" to the violation of the credit limit.8 3 The
definition of "reasonable and proportional" is unclear, but will be
addressed by rules to be promulgated by the Board.84
By requiring Holders to take a voluntary act to be charged a fee, the
CARD Act addresses the asymmetrical information and differing
incentives of the parties by aligning the Issuer's incentive to charge fees
(and its information about what the fees are) with the Holder's lack of
information regarding what the fees are and when they can be charged. 85
81. See discussion of optimism bias in Part Ill.A, supra.
82. See discussion of quantity effect in Part IlA, supra.
83. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 102(b).
84. Id.
85. See Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1394 ("The high fees that issuers charge for late payments and
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The effectiveness of this reform will be based on the Board requirements
regarding the timing and form of disclosure and election, but the CARD
Act takes an important step towards addressing this particular flaw in
credit card agreements.
D. Prohibitions and Other Severe Restrictions
The CARD Act also has imposed stronger regulation that essentially
mandates or restricts certain terms and conditions in credit card
agreements. This heavy-handed approach is apparently tailored towards
those issues where strict regulation is not likely to have a negative
impact on the availability of credit and where Issuers generally have
provided default contract provisions unfavorable to, and likely to be
ignored by, Holders. This approach also reduces the need for dispute
resolution regarding the validity or binding nature of such provisions or
practices because the permitted practices are very narrowly defined.
A compelling segment of the CARD Act may be the general
prohibition on interest rate adjustments on existing balances. Prior to
the CARD Act, Issuers often included provisions in the credit card
agreements that would permit them to increase the interest rate on
existing balances. 86 In other words, if a Holder currently paid interest at
an annual rate of twelve percent on existing balances that dated back
three years, an Issuer could increase the interest rate on that balance.
This is different from the teaser rate reforms discussed in Part III.A,
supra, where the interest rate may be increased retroactively with
respect to a given period so long as the borrower is fully informed prior
to the date of borrowing that the rate may be increased to a certain
amount if payments are not made within a given period. Under the
CARD Act, Issuers may not change the interest rate on any card for an
outstanding account balance unless certain conditions are met, including
the teaser disclosure requirements described above or a sixty day
delinquency on the account (which may be restored to the previous
interest rate after six months of timely payments). 87
Issuers have argued that their ability to modify current rate structures
is necessary to compensate Issuers for lending to riskier Holders. 88 This
for exceeding the credit limit have no basis in the extra cost to issuers... even accounting for the
potentially heightened risk of accommodating a consumer who failed to pay on time or remain within
the specified credit line. This disparity between price and cost is especially striking when the late and
over-limit fees are set at fixed dollar amounts, irrespective of the tardiness of the payment or the
magnitude of the deviation from the credit limit.").
86. See discussion in Part II, supra.
87. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 10 1(a).
88. VICIOUS CYCLE, supra note 24, at 2; see also Plunkett Statement, supra note 24, at 165. It
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contention, however, is belied by the fact that any underwriting with
respect to the credit risk of a particular borrower would have been
completed by the Issuer when the charges were being incurred. 89  It is
one issue to increase the interest rate going forward with respect to an
uncreditworthy borrower for future transactions, but it is quite another to
increase the interest rate on a Holder's existing balance where the Issuer
has determined that, in retrospect, it made a poor underwriting
assessment for purposes of determining the initially offered rate.
90
By prohibiting unilateral increases in rates for existing balances, the
hope is that any negative impact associated with the inability of Issuers
to engage in such practices, such as the potential for Issuers to reduce
the amount of credit to extend, is outweighed substantially by the
potential for unfortunate and unanticipated results when such practices
are permitted. It is, in fact, unclear how much less credit will be made
available to credit card holders or how much more expensive credit will
be (in the form of higher interest rates) because of Issuers' inability to
change unilaterally and retroactively the interest rate on existing
balances. The CARD Act does attempt to address the collection
concerns of financial institutions by permitting changes in the terms
governing repayment of existing balances, but limits these changes to a
repayment method that provides either a five year principal repayment
period or a required minimum payment that is (on a percentage basis)
not more than twice that required prior to increase in the interest rate.
9 1
In other words, if, because of changed circumstances, an Issuer deems
that a previously creditworthy Holder may not be able to pay, the Issuer
may not increase the existing interest rate but may require accelerated
principal payments.
In this situation, it may be that the "soft paternalism" approach used
elsewhere in the CARD Act with respect to additional disclosure would
not be suitable to address the systemic asymmetries documented in this
context. In other words, there may not be a mechanism to permit or
enable Holders to make better choices regarding credit card agreements
also has been suggested that changing to penalty rates is useful to motivate borrowers more responsibly.
See FRANK, supra note 25, at 8 (citing American Bankers Association study).
89. This contention is also contradicted by empirical data. FRANK, supra note 25, at 11
(concluding that empirical data suggests that Issuer practices with respect to imposing penalty interest
rates more resembles "excuse-based pricing" in that "issuers try to find excuses to increase rates as
much as possible rather than making a legitimate attempt to correlate rate with risk.").
90. Id. at 12 ("Both the card holders and card issuers would benefit from responsible
underwriting in the beginning, and the integrity of a competitive market would be enhanced by
transparent, and real price information when consumers first choose a card.").
91. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 101(a).
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that permit rate increases for existing balances. 92 For example, it would
be impossible for a Holder to determine accurately the likelihood of an
Issuer deciding in the future to increase the Holder's interest rate on
existing balances, even if the Holder was aware of that possibility. In
fact, it is likely that most Holders would be subject to the biases
described above that would otherwise limit their ability to accurately
assess that risk. In particular, as noted above, individuals tend to be
irrationally optimistic in calculating the risks within the consumer
context. 93  Moreover, it is probable that the Holders whose interest rate
for existing balances will be increased are the same "[u]nrealistically
optimistic people" who "borrow more than they otherwise would" in the
first place.9 4 As a result, such individuals may not be able to assess the
risk of such a contractual provision.
The CARD Act also regulates other Issuer practices and credit card
agreement terms. 95  It prohibits Issuers from imposing finance charges
on payments made prior to 5:00 p.m. on the due date (as opposed to a
contractually imposed earlier deadline) or changing the payment due
date for different months. 96  The CARD Act also requires Issuers to
apply credit card holder payments in excess of the minimum
requirement towards the balance with the highest interest rate, as
opposed to "cherry-picking" the most favorable rate for the benefit of
92. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L,
REv. 1165, 1225 (2003) ("Paternalistic constraints on choice cannot be justified with psychology absent
a showing that the costs of privately developing better ways to make choices are greater than the costs of
restricting individual choice.").
93. See FRANK, supra note 25, at 7-8 (suggesting that current Issuer disclosure regarding the
potential for penalty interest rates are designed based on Holders' inattention to such disclosures and
"plays into known behavioral biases such as excessive optimism"); see also Prentice, supra note 10, at
362-63.
94. Williams, supra note 38, at 788.
95. The CARD Act also sets forth a number of restrictions with respect to issuances of credit
cards to individuals under the age of twenty-one, including requiring either a co-signer on the account or
submission of financial information evidencing ability to repay before issuing a card and also requiring
institutions of higher education to publicly disclose any agreement with a financial institution for credit
card marketing purposes. The CARD Act, supra note 5, §§ 301-305. A complete analysis of these
restrictions is beyond the scope of this Article, but the author wonders whether any of the justifications
for the protections for underage individuals would also justify additional protections for overage
individuals. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 7, at 610 (arguing that the law should protect the consumer
class interests because consumers are unable to evaluate accurately the standard form contract terms
similar to the way in which the law differentiates between contracts with adults and contracts with
minors); see also Williams, supra note 38, at 743 (finding that college students and Americans in
general exist similar tendencies with respect to exhibiting an optimism bias). In addition, the use of
credit cards does not necessarily result in more "risky" behavior by underage individuals. See Karen
Blumenthal, Teaching Kids About Money The Hard Way, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2009, at D1.
96. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 104. Similarly, if the payment due date falls on a weekend
or holiday, then the Issuer may not treat a payment received on the next business day as late. Id.
§ 106(a).
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Issuers.97 Finally, the CARD Act generally prohibits the Issuer practice
of "double-cycle billing," where a finance charge could be assessed on
prior balances for failure to pay during current billing periods. 98
As a result of these new default rules, the CARD Act likely meets the
ex ante preferences of unknowing or uncomprehending Holders. In
other words, if Holders actually bargained for the credit card agreement
terms, Holders would choose terms that prevent payment deadlines prior
to the close of business on the due date, setting inconsistent payment due
dates, or double-cycle billing, and would require excess payments to be
applied to the highest possible interest rate. Issuers now face a loss of
revenue generated from the fees and interest charged under the formerly
malleable default contract rules, and consequently, the calculus used by
Issuers when extending credit and setting rates will likely be adjusted
accordingly.
In the product liability context, it has been argued that an enterprise
liability regime may be desirable to address market manipulation and
ensure that risks are fully disclosed and that all costs are not surprisingly
externalized onto consumers, especially when consumers are ill-
equipped to internalize such risks. 99 Similarly, the (newly-restricted)
credit card charges and fees described above may be seen as risks that
no longer are borne unknowingly by the Holders. It is somewhat more
problematic, of course, in this context to describe these charges and fees
as risks because they are beneficial, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, to the
Issuers. Nevertheless, the Issuers' loss of anticipated revenue as a result
of these new default rules either has to be internalized by the Issuers by
accepting lower revenues without otherwise changing their behavior or
expressly passing along as the "cost" to Holders through higher interest
rates or other upfront fees. It has been predicted, for example, that the
CARD Act will subtract $10 billion from Issuers' revenues, primarily as
a result of the new restrictions on penalty fees and higher interest
rates. 100
If the revenue associated with those practices is required by the
Issuers to provide credit card services, then these costs or risks should be
reflected in the price of the service (e.g., the interest rate). ' 0' Following
97. Id. § 104.
98. Id. § 102(a).
99. See generally Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 61; Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation,
6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000).
100. Sidel, supra note 58.
101. Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card Regulations Force
Low-Income Borrowers Into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 453
(2009) ("A regulation that increased the transparency of credit card practices and caused issuers to seek
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this thesis to the end, if Holders borrow less because the "true" cost of
borrowing has been revealed in the price, then Holders will have
signaled that they previously were borrowing too much under the prior
contractual agreements and now have been able to counteract the
"quantity effect." By providing contractual default rules that restrict
Issuers' ability to generate revenue through costs (risks) not currently
well-understood by Holders, the "price" of credit card services will be
more clearly disclosed.
E. Enforcement
In contrast to the broad changes to the requirements imposed on
Issuers regarding credit card agreements, the CARD Act largely leaves
the current enforcement regime unchanged. The CARD Act increases
monetary penalties for violations of the requirements for consumer
credit cards to a maximum of $5,000, which may be increased in the
instance of an established pattern or practice of violations.' 02 To aid the
Board's determination of violations (and detection by consumer
advocacy groups), Issuers are also required to post their credit card
agreements on an Internet site and submit copies electronically to the
Board. 103
The Board also is required to conduct a review every two years of
credit card agreements, including reviewing the terms of credit card
agreements, the practices of credit card issuers, the effectiveness of
current disclosure requirements and protections against deceptive credit
card practices, and any impact of the CARD Act on the availability or
cost of credit, especially with respect to "nonprime borrowers," the
stability of credit card issuers, risk-based pricing, and new credit card
products or services.' °4  These reviews are required to include
solicitation of comments from Holders, Issuers, and other interested
parties.10 5 After conducting the review, the Board is required to publish
a summary of the review and any proposed changes to current
regulations, as well as report to Congress on its review.' 0 6  Finally,
certain enforcement agencies (such as the Federal Trade Commission)
the lost revenue elsewhere would still leave them considerable room to increase interest rates without
triggering substitution away from their products.").
102. The CARD Act, supra note 5, § 107.
103. Id. § 204(a). Individually negotiated changes to agreements are not required to be disclosed.
Id.
104. Id. § 502(a).
105. Id. § 502(b).
106. Id. § 502(c)-(d). If the Board determines that no changes are needed, it must disclose the
reason for its determination. Id. § 502(c).
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are required to report annually to the Board regarding Issuer compliance
with the Card Act and other consumer protection statutes and
regulations. 107
Posting credit card agreements in public may be the most useful
change in the CARD Act with respect to the current enforcement
regime. Between government regulators and consumer watchdog
groups, the review of credit card agreements for compliance with the
CARD Act and other statutes and regulations should be more substantial
and thorough. 10 8  The CARD Act does not, however, require public
disclosure of the forms of notice used by Issuers to inform consumers of
pending increases in interest rates or with respect to teaser rates.'
0 9
Given the importance of the additional disclosure requirements, it is not
clear why the publication requirement was not extended for such
purposes as well.
More importantly, it is not clear that federal agencies are equipped or
motivated to address adequately financial institutions' compliance with
consumer credit card laws. 10 In addition, relying on the Board to
promulgate and enforce rules for effective disclosure under the CARD
Act may actually result in worse consumer comprehension. For
example, if Issuers are required to provide additional disclosure
documents as a result of the Board's new rules, then this may lead to
"information overload" and result in Holders disregarding the additional
disclosures, together with all other disclosures." Another problem with
relying on regulatory enforcement is that it is focused on Issuer
compliance rather than Holder comprehension. In other words, the
Board will focus on whether the Issuer met the Board's standard rather
than whether the standard properly protects Holder. The Board may
consider such issues when promulgating the rules, but there is no
107. Id. § 502(e).
108. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is possible that the posting requirement for
credit card agreements could assist not only in enforcing credit card laws and rules (by both providing
the public with relevant information) but also act as a "shaming sanction" where Issuers with
agreements that violate the laws are identified or otherwise have their agreements corrected (publicly)
on the same website. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, What's Wrong With Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62
TAX L. REv. 539 (2009) (discussing the arguments for and against imposing "shaming sanctions" on
corporations that violate tax laws).
109. Of course, to the extent that the exact structure of such notice is required by rules of the
Board, then this concern may be alleviated. Regardless, it would be preferable for the public to be able
to review and verify the form and presentation of such notices.
110. See, e.g., Feds Take Overdue First Step To Curb Credit Card Business, USA TODAY, May 6,
2008, at A1O (noting that "[o]ne major obstacle [to the promulgation of final rules] is the regulators'
own tendency to debate and delay"); see also Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to
Environmental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 520 (2002) (noting the general disconnect between
regulatory agencies and protected citizens).
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 407, 425 (1990).
14952010]
1496 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol.78
assurance that this will occur or that the Board will be able to adapt
promptly or at all if such rules ultimately are ineffective. 112
It is also possible that the uproar over credit card practices has come
to the forefront not because of increased detection by enforcement
officials but because of negative economic conditions and publicity by
public advocacy groups. Given federal agencies' inability to police
Issuers effectively to date, the CARD Act may fail to provide credit card
consumers any additional enforcement protection due to its unchanged
and exclusive reliance on such agencies. Suggestions to address such
shortcomings are detailed in Part IV.C, infra.
Another notable weakness of the CARD Act is its failure to address
mandatory individual arbitration provisions within credit card
agreements. 113 These provisions require all disputes regarding the credit
card agreement to be addressed through arbitration on an individual and
not collective basis (e.g., through a class action lawsuit). Such
provisions also typically permit Issuers to choose the arbitration firm.
These provisions are problematic because they have prevented Holders
from actively, collectively, and publicly seeking redress for Issuer
misbehavior or breaches of a credit card agreement. As a result, some
have concluded that "[e]very indication is that the imposed arbitration
clauses are nothing but a shield against legal accountability by the credit
card companies." 14
As with credit card agreements in general, arbitration clauses
typically are imposed in a more or less "take-it-or-leave-it" fashion and
included in the fine print or ancillary portions of the credit card
agreement."15  As a result, many Holders are not aware that they are
agreeing to binding arbitration when entering in a credit card
agreement. 116 In addition, even if Holders read and comprehend that an
112. See Williams & Bylsma, supra note 1, at 874 (expressing concern about using fixed rules
that do not have the flexibility "so that disclosure requirements will not be outpaced by rapidly evolving
market practices."). Williams and Bylsma also raise the concern that the "piecemeal" process of
promulgating rules in response to particular concerns will "lead to rules that over time highlight terms
and conditions that are no longer most relevant to a consumer in shopping for credit, result in unwieldy
disclosure statements, and impose unjustifiable costs on creditors relative to the consumer benefits." Id.
Consequently, this Article proposed permitting the evolving common law to address concerns about the
adequacy of disclosure. See Part IV.B, infra.
113. Carter et al., supra note 25, at 45 ("The use of arbitration provisions in credit card
agreements has been a tremendous barrier for consumers seeking redress.").
114. Issacharoff& Delaney, supra note 6, at 173.
115. ld. at 176.
116. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate though Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73 (2004)
(indicating that "this study provides little basis for believing that consumers are making informed
decisions when they 'agree' to arbitrate"); see also Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 173 (noting
that "there is every reason to believe" that Holders will not act upon disclosure of an arbitration clause).
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arbitration clause exists, it has been argued that Holders' "predictable
irrationality biases" will prevent them from properly assessing the costs
and risks associated with accepting such a clause.' 7 These biases, such
as the tendency for individuals to underestimate the likelihood of a
particular unfavorable event occurring (such as needing to sue an
Issuer), may result in Holders undervaluing the right to bring a private
suit.l1B
Arbitrators and arbitration firms also are financially incentivized to
favor Issuers over Holders because arbitrators are often compensated
based on the amount of cases referred to them by Holders. 119 If
arbitration firms or individual arbitrators provide what is perceived to be
anticorporate stances about arbitration policies (such as permitting class-
wide arbitrations) or arbitration results (in favor of Holder), then such
firms or providers can expect to see reduced "business" in the future
from corporate clients. 20  As a result of the "repeat player effect"-
where the neutrality of the arbitrator can be affected in favor of the
entity that refers claims to the arbitrator or arbitration firm-Holders can
expect poorer results than might otherwise be expected in the event of an
arbitrated dispute. 121
Finally, arbitration proceedings typically are confidential and leave a
limited (if any) written record. 122 The result of this lack of publicity and
public record can restrict societal awareness of any wrongdoing by
Issuers, which impacts both regulators and other similarly situated
Holders. Contrary to an arbitration proceeding conducted in secret
without records, "[a] public enforcement proceeding also alerts the
117. Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1649 (2005).
118. Id. (also noting that "psychologists have shown that people are risk-seeking with respect to
certain prospective losses. Given the motivation for profit maximization, it seems inevitable that, absent
regulation, companies will seek to take advantage of consumers' irrational behavior by manipulating
arbitration clauses." (footnote omitted)); see also Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract
Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1301 (1993)
(suggesting that "[c]ourts and sellers should realize that consumers do not knowingly assent to terms
that effectively discard their legal rights," because they "rarely consider even the possibility of a
subsequent legal action").
119. JOHN O'DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 8 (2007) ("Unlike judges, arbitrators are paid only when they are
assigned cases by arbitration companies."); Carter et al., supra note 25, at 46 (noting that arbitration
proceedings are "often conducted by arbitration providers that are amazingly biased against
consumers.").
120. Stemlight, supra note 117, at 1650 (noting how arbitration providers compete to provide
dispute services for companies that require their customers to sign contracts with arbitration provisions).
121. See Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3
NEV. L. J. 259, 285 (2003) (noting that "many predispute arbitration agreements, as they are written,
load the dice to the advantage of the repeat player" who is the drafter of the agreement).
122. See O'DONNELL, supra note 119, at 7.
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general public to the need for regulation and enables them to measure
the usefulness of their legal institutions."' 123  As a result of arbitration,
individual Holders may not become aware that they are similarly
situated with other wronged individuals and consequently be more
reluctant to pursue their own remedies. 1
24
Most troubling, mandatory individual binding arbitration clauses
prevent similarly situated Holders from seeking redress for Issuer
breaches or wrongdoing that may not be sufficiently significant for each
individual to proceed by herself, but is substantial in the aggregate.
125
Consequently, individual small claims generally will not be brought in
individual arbitration proceedings, because the claim value will be
insignificant (either generally or relative to the cost and effort of
bringing such a claim), even if the claim value is material to a particular
individual. 1
26
Not surprisingly, the empirical results suggest that Holders rarely, if
ever, bring a claim in arbitration, and Holders rarely prevail in
arbitration proceedings. 127  The inability of individuals to seek redress
adequately through the courts is a significant flaw in the CARD Act
reforms, and may very well undercut the significance of the additional
required disclosures and protections. The future of binding individual
arbitration clauses, however, is very much in flux as a result of the
recent actions by certain arbitration firms to withdraw from resolving
arbitration disputes.128  These withdrawal actions are not a response to
the CARD Act but instead follow litigation instituted by the Minnesota
attorney general's office regarding the National Arbitration Forum's
practices of resolving consumer debt disputes, including many of the
problems noted above. 129
123. Carrington, supra note 121, at 283; see also Sternlight, supra note 117, at 1649.
124. See Carrington, supra note 121, at 283 ("It is clear that [arbitration's secrecy] is one of its
attractions to predatory business because it diminishes the likelihood that the success of one claim by a
consumer or employee will encourage others like it.").
125. See generally Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6 (examining the prohibition on collective
actions as a result of mandatory individual arbitration clauses in various contexts).
126. Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 158 (noting that in "all markets characterized by
large sellers and relatively atomized consumers, there is the risk of improper practices that impose small,
almost inconsequential costs on individuals but yield significant returns in the aggregate.")
127. See Sternlight, supra note 117, at 1655 (noting that a particular Issuer filed over 50,000
arbitration claims against Holders during a two-year period as opposed to four claims made by Holders
against the Issuer).
128. Robin Sidel & Amol Sharma, Credit-Card Disputes Tossed into Disarray, Wall St. J., July
22, 2009, at Al (reporting that The American Arbitration Association and The National Arbitration
Forum would cease resolving credit card debt disputes).
129. Id.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES AND PROPOSED REFORMS
A more complete reform of credit card contracts would address the ex
ante concerns regarding the weakness of passive disclosure as well as
the ex post issues regarding enforcement of regulatory requirements and
the underlying agreement for the benefit of Holders. By better
addressing the information asymmetries as well as Issuers' underlying
incentives, Issuers will prepare credit card agreements that, to the extent
reasonably practicable, inform Holders of the true costs of borrowing
when the Holders are best able to assess their likely ability to repay
amounts borrowed (as well as paying all the other "costs" of the
agreement). These reforms are based on an understanding that, although
an "efficient scheme for interpreting and enforcing form contracts would
encourage the seller, with substantially lower information costs, to share
critical information with consumers," such a scheme, to be truly
effective, would need to address any inability by certain Holders to
process and use effectively such information.' 
30
A. Modifying Passive Disclosure
In several circumstances, the CARD Act relies solely on disclosure to
Holders without also requiring Holders to evidence affirmatively (or
separately) their assent to the particular provision being modified. For
example, as noted in Part III.A, supra, the CARD Act generally requires
Issuers to disclose to Holders pending interest rate increases in advance
and permits Holders to terminate the account prior to the effective date
of the rate increase. There is no separate mechanism, however, that
signifies Holders' actual assent to the credit card agreement's modified
term (the new interest rate). Instead, if a Holder does not read the
particular notice (e.g., if a Holder fails to open the mail) or fails to take
note of the notice or disclosures (because of the significant amount of
other accompanying credit card disclosures or notices, or Issuer
obfuscation of the notice), then the Holder nevertheless is deemed to
have agreed to modify one of the most important terms of the borrowing
agreement. It also is likely that many Holders will fail to take action
because of the behavioral biases noted above, such as the status quo
bias. This failure to take action should not be interpreted as voluntary
assent.
130. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 610; see also Williams, supra note 38, at 789 ("If consumers
systematically underestimate their borrowing and overestimate their ability to repay, and debiasing is not
a realistic option, policymakers should explore insulation strategies that decrease the costs of these
erroneous expectations" and "impose little or no burden on most credit card consumers.").
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A mechanism that could be used in these circumstances is the
presumption that any modification to an agreement to the Holder's
detriment (such as an increased interest rate or increased penalty fees)
would result in termination of the credit card agreement unless Holder
affirmatively opted in and accepted the modification. 131 For example, in
the context of the interest rate increase, the credit card agreement would
terminate on the effective date of the interest rate increase unless the
Holder sent a signed notice to the Issuer affirmatively agreeing to the
increase. Such a shift would address concerns about the effectiveness of
the disclosure of the interest rate to Holders, as Issuers' incentive to
"hide the ball" would disappear. Instead, Issuers would be incentivized
to ensure that Holders understood that the agreement would be
terminated unless Holders agreed to the rate increase. One can imagine
the boldface notices to Holders warning them that their account is in
danger of cancellation unless the Holder agrees to the pending rate
increase. To the extent that cancellation of the account is undesirable to
a particular Holder, then the Holder would be aware of the pending
cancellation because of the enhanced disclosure and empowered to
prevent the cancellation by taking an affirmative act signifying
agreement to the modified term.
Moreover, by establishing a default rule that does not permit
unilateral contractual modification by Issuers in the future, the future-
looking biases of Holders are limited. Typically, Holders may execute a
credit card agreement with an unfavorable term, such as reserving an
Issuer's right to increase unilaterally interest rates, because Holders are
by nature overly optimistic about the likelihood of that unfavorable
event ever occurring.' 32 A mechanism that requires affirmative opting
in, on the other hand, forces Holders to address the certainty, rather than
the possibility of, an unfavorable event (the unfavorable contractual
change) occurring. Once informed, Holders can either affirmatively
accept or passively reject such a possibility.
The potential revenue loss to Issuers as a result of cancellation of
agreements (following notice of increased interest rates) also would
force Issuers to make underwriting decisions more carefully in advance
(such as when setting initial interest rates), because Issuers would be
faced with more (and a more accurate number of) Holders who, if
131. A default rule "is both libertarian and paternalistic if it retains freedom of choice while also
leading people to make decisions that will improve their well-being." Sunstein, supra note 41, at 256;
see also Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1421 ("Individuals tend to make fewer mistakes when a decision
involves higher costs. It is rational to invest more (e.g., in improving one's understanding of the future
implications of a contract), when there is a cost associated with signing the contract [such as reading the
disclosure and affirmatively opting in].").
132. See Williams, supra note 38, at 783.
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properly informed, actually would want to terminate their account if
their interest rate was increased. In other words, Issuer underwriting
mistakes cannot be corrected by shifting the cost to Holders without
affirmative and actual Holder consent.' 33 Of course, this incentive shift
is partially developed through the CARD Act's provision for Holder
termination of the agreement following notice of an interest rate
increase, but Issuers could still, when assessing the potential effect of an
interest rate increase, rely on faulty or missed disclosures as well as
Holder behavioral biases that would lead to fewer Holders opting out.
It could be argued that less credit will be available, or at the very
least, credit will be more expensive because of reforms that limit
Issuers' unilateral ability to increase interest rates.134  For example, if
Issuers are unlikely to generate additional interest from increasing
interest rates unilaterally, then Issuers may reduce the credit available to
a particular Holder (to prevent the Holder from borrowing too much at a
rate that is too low), increase the initial interest rate, or charge additional
upfront fees (to compensate Issuers for the lost revenue). This argument
assumes, however, that the amount of additional Issuer revenue
currently generated from unilateral increases in interest rates is not a
corresponding (and improper) cost to Holders. 135  If Issuers have been
able to generate revenue from costs borne by Holders as a result of
contractual terms modified without Holders' desire, knowledge, or
assent, then the true cost of Holders' borrowings have not been
internalized and assessed by Holders in advance. This means that
Holders have not been borrowing at the appropriate rate (the "quantity
effect"). If Issuers will not provide the service of a credit card without
the compensation currently realized through unilateral rate increases,
then Issuers can recoup such amounts through increased initial interest
133. See VICIOUS CYCLE, supra note 24, at 5 (noting how Issuers "share the risk" of Holder
default by increasing the interest rates on other cardholders, including in situations (such as a recession)
where it is difficult for credit cardholders to obtain an alternative lower interest rate credit card); see also
Lazarus, supra note I (criticizing Issuers' "decidedly shortsighted approach to punish those customers
who still pay their bills [by increasing their interest rates] and haven't shown themselves to represent
any greater risk" during a downturn in the economy.).
134. Sidel, supra note 58, at A21 ("Industry executives say that credit is likely to become less
available, particularly to risky borrowers, and more fees likely will be loaded into the front end of the
account, rather than being assessed after a customer falls behind on payments."); see also Joseph
William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV 899, 974 (2009) (describing
generally the argument that "adverse consequences of regulation could overwhelm any benefits sought
by imposing minimum standards on the contractual relationship").
135. See also Meyerson, supra note 7, at 622-23 (suggesting that "enforcing all standard contract
terms as drafted merely to lower sales prices for poor consumers falls into the category of paternalism: a
nonefficient regimen whose sole justification is the protection of the welfare of certain individuals," as
opposed to a regimen that "reduces information costs and decreases the likelihood of one party's
unknowing assumption of risk, [which] is easily justified on nonpaternalistic, economic grounds.").
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rates that disclose to the Holder the actual costs of borrowing under the
particular credit card agreement. Of course, the market may constrain a
particular Issuer from doing so because other Issuers will continue to
lend at the old interest rates, but this is not a defect in the market and is,
in fact, a correction.' 36  There also is evidence that the fears of
additional costs to be imposed on Holders as a result of such additional
regulation are unfounded. 1
37
Holders may still borrow too much at a given rate because of certain
behavioral biases, such as the optimism bias. 138  In particular, teaser
rates are difficult because there may be little that can be done to counter
the effect of the optimism bias and other biases that may prevent
Holders from accurately assessing the risks involved with borrowing at a
teaser rate, regardless of the quality of factual disclosure. 139  If,
however, the standard of disclosure is adjusted to a subjective
understanding standard, or at least investigated for general effectiveness,
then it is possible that Issuers may develop standards of disclosure
designed to temper the optimism bias itself.140  In addition, altering the
presumption of enforceability, as suggested in Part IV.B, infra, may also
lead to disclosures designed to negate the optimism bias. Finally, in the
absence of "harder" paternalistic policies (such as banning credit cards),
which may not be cost-justified or have other risks, 141 it may not be
136. In fact, it has been suggested that, rather than a required opt-in, Issuers would be required to
permit other lenders to "bid" on the existing credit card account if the current Issuer desired to modify
unilaterally a term of the provision. Holders could then either stick with the existing Issuer (with the
modified contract term) or switch to a new Issuer. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, A Market Test for
Credit Cards, FORBES, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0713/opinions-
market-credit-cards-why-not.html. Such a "market test" is not necessarily incompatible with an opt-in
mechanism as an additional feature.
137. See Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, A Fairer Credit Card? Priceless, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2009, at A25 (concluding, based on a comparison of credit cards issued by banks (owned by
shareholders) to those issued by credit unions (owned by customers), that the lending model used by
credit unions would be feasible for banks, even though credit card unions typically charged lower fees
and were less likely to charge penalty or late fees).
138. Williams, supra note 38, at 790 ("The main pattern that emerges is that debiasing is unlikely
to correct above-average effects and errors that people make when they are predicting their likelihood of
suffering some future negative event," such as being unable to pay accrued debt at the nonteaser rate);
see also Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1378, 1418 ("If a consumer believes that she will not borrow on her
card, she will not mind the high interest rate, no matter how large the font .... Knowledge of credit
terms is meaningless if the consumer mistakenly believes that she will not borrow.").
139. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 268 (suggesting that outright prohibitions may be appropriate
with respect to certain credit card practices such as teaser rates).
140. Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1418 (suggesting that disclosure to Holders regarding their
anticipated or predicted borrowing behavior must address the over-optimism effect to be effective); see
also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 258 (suggesting that over-optimism could be addressed by "vivid
narratives of possible harm" involved with over-borrowing, which would be intended to permit Holders
to appreciate better the future costs of borrowing).
141. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 254-55 (discussing generally the arguments against "strong
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possible to close the "gap between expectations and reality, at least not
completely." 
142
In any event, the reforms suggested in this Article are not intended to
supplant the Holder as the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to
Holder's credit and borrowing decisions, but rather to position the
Holder on a timely basis with the information necessary to make such
decisions.143 If Holders are unable to make the "correct" borrowing
decision, then the costs will be borne by the Holder (such as increased
interest payments) or the Issuer (e.g., if the Holder declares bankruptcy
and the debts are extinguished). The choice between respecting a
Holder's preferences for borrowing too much and judging or correcting
a Holder's "defect" that prevents a "proper" amount of borrowing
ultimately is a philosophical one, 44 regardless of any empirical
evidence suggesting that, in hindsight, people may over-borrow (so long
as such decision was made after being provided all relevant
information).145 An author has suggested that "[t]his tendency [to over-
borrow because of the optimism bias], once combined with consumers'
poor understanding of interest charges and the rights of credit card
companies to retroactively increase rates," leads to bankruptcy (and
presumably other costs) more often than other types of debt. 146
Consequently, the reforms suggested by the CARD Act and this Article
are directed in a multi-faceted approach towards burdening Issuers with
tempering Holder behavioral biases while at the same time limiting
Issuer's unilateral contracting power.
A stronger criticism is that certain Holders may not have alternatives
paternalism").
142. Williams, supra note 38, at 790.
143. See Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1253 (advising caution when determining whether
"patterns of apparently irrational behavior are mistakes or expressions of stable preference."). Camerer
et al. highlight the popularity of extended warranties and discuss how the profitability for retailers from
warranties may lead to the inference that buyers are "overpurchasing" them. The author concluded that
fully informed purchasers may realize actual benefits from such purchases, which may lead to policy
recommendations for increased disclosure rather than prohibitions. Id. Similarly, from an efficiency
standpoint, mistakes are not relevant, either. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 614 (asserting that "[s]ince
efficiency is only concerned with informed risk taking, not with whether a given gamble pays off, the
consumer should have no valid complaint if she knowingly elects to take a chance that she will be
unable to pay all her debt, and thereafter defaults.").
144. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 253-54 (noting that "for particular people, it is difficult to
know whether a particular level of borrowing is optimal .... In addition, what seems to be bounded
rationality may simply involve idiosyncratic tastes."); see also Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1218
("In a sense, behavioral economics extends the paternalistically protected category of'idiots' to include
most people, at predictable times.").
145. Williams, supra note 38, at 785 (suggesting that the link between credit card debt and
bankruptcy indicates that Holders incur more debt than they actually desire).
146. Id. at 785-86 (footnote omitted).
2010] 1503
1504 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.78
for their basic credit needs, which means that disclosure may not be
enough to justify enforcing a credit card agreement against a Holder.
For example, if a Holder is faced with the decision to use a credit card to
purchase food even though the Holder knows that the Holder will be
unable to pay off the debt, then the Holder did not in fact have a
"decision" to make, which could suggest limiting the enforceability of
the credit card agreement. 147 Consumer credit, however, is neither a
property right nor a government program to supplement income. In
addition, Issuers generally bear the ultimate risk of nonpayment because
consumer credit card debt typically is unsecured. Just as the Holder
bears the risk that the Holder will be unable to pay a debt incurred (and
as a result incur interest or other charges), the Issuer bears the same risk
of nonpayment (and risk not collecting any principal, interest, or fees).
Finally, contrary to prevailing wisdom, reducing credit card availability
would not necessarily lead to more "undesirable" forms of debt for
lower income individuals, as credit card debt is not a preferred form of
debt for many Holders and may, in fact, be self-stimulating (i.e.,
incurred because the Holder has the ability to incur it rather than out of
necessity). 148
As with any other disclosure, Issuers may be inclined to obfuscate
required notice regarding the pending increase in the interest rate and
instead to emphasize the loss of the benefits of the credit card itself.
This can be rectified through rules clarifying the standard for the
affirmative opt-in from Holders to be executed in connection with a
Holder's acceptance of a modification of the rate term. This also can be
addressed through the ex post enforcement of the disclosure standard,
including through the enforcement standards and mechanisms suggested
in Part IV.B-C, infra. Consequently, requiring Holders to evidence
affirmatively their agreement to any proposed modification to their
credit card agreements would induce better and more complete
disclosure from Issuers.
147. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 302 (2003)
("Making someone liable for outcomes over which she wielded comparatively little dispositional control
and where her situation is relatively controlling would be unjust, unfair, or inefficient, depending on the
theoretical focus.").
148. Littwin, supra note 101, at 426, 454 (concluding that "credit cards are actually among low-
income consumers' least-preferred sources of credit, meaning that there is no 'worse' alternative to
which they would turn if credit card access were reduced," and noting that "credit cards, in and of
themselves, may stimulate spending").
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B. Shifting the Presumption of Enforceability
In certain circumstances, an affirmative opt-in by a Holder to a
particular contractual provision is not feasible. At the time of the credit
card agreement's initial execution, for example, it is not clear whether a
Holder has actually read all or merely some of the agreement's
provisions. As demonstrated in Part II, supra, consumers generally do
not focus on or comprehend many contractual terms, and Issuers draft
credit card agreements to their advantage accordingly. Although the
CARD Act requires additional disclosure with respect to certain terms,
and prohibits certain contractual practices, the CARD Act fails to
address the fundamental asymmetries of information and incentives
between Holders and Issuers.
Consequently, new reform is needed to induce Issuers, as the actors
with the most information and resources, to share the information
regarding the contractual provisions with Holders, the actors with the
least information and resources. One reform that has been suggested
elsewhere in the form contract context is altering the presumption of
contract enforceability for the consumer's (Holder's) benefit. 149 This is
somewhat intuitive because Issuers control preparation of the credit card
agreement and its disclosures, which suggests that Issuers should be
responsible for disclosure that is inaccurate or incomplete.'
50
149. See Meyerson, supra note 7, at 610; see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 460
(explaining that, in some contexts, "the doctrine of reasonable expectations thus creates an affirmative
duty on the part of the business to point out and explain reasonably unexpected terms even if they
clearly were stated in the contract"). This Article, as will be seen, proposes that, rather than determining
which provisions are "reasonably unexpected," there would be a presumption of unexpected terms with
respect to the entire credit card agreement, which would induce the desired information-sharing behavior
by Issuers. The prevailing theory of "blanket assent," which suggests that reasonable (both in
presentation and substance) standard form contracts should be enforced, even though most consumers do
not read them, would be set aside and remove the "difficult task of drawing a line between permissible
and impermissible pressure and terms." Id. at 462. Instead, courts would review the adequacy of
disclosure and leave it to sellers to determine what "unreasonable terms" to include and to seek the most
effective method of disclosure. See also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 246-48 (arguing that the "law is
properly moving toward basing the enforceability of preprinted terms, as well as the role of such terms
in contract formation, purely on the limits of cognition, rather than on unfairness").
150. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 610-11 (arguing that "because the seller is better able to control
the conveying of information, sellers who give incorrect or misleading information to consumers should
be held liable for the error"). Requiring a different standard for information disclosure is an example of
an "asymmetrically paternalistic" technique, which is designed to have large benefits on those
individuals who may be influenced by behavioral biases (such as the optimism bias) versus those who
are not so biased. Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1212. Shifting the presumption of enforceability
regarding disclosure (with respect to unfavorable changes in terms) should impose very little costs on
unbiased Holders (because such unbiased Holders probably already understand or are unaffected
adversely by the disclosures), while at the same time providing a significant benefit to biased Holders
that might otherwise discount the possibility (versus the certainty) of an unfavorable term being
imposed.
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Consequently, if Issuers do not share information regarding a particular
term, the credit card agreement should be deemed to include provisions
that the Holder would have agreed to if such information had been
shared.151 This is based on the Issuers being "encouraged to either
ascertain those [Holders'] expectations or alter them by providing
adequate information."' 5 2 As a result, the contract can be assumed to be
a "value-maximizing transaction" because both parties will be
"operating under the same accurate assumptions as to the meaning and
value of their contract." 1
53
Taking the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" a step farther, this
Article suggests the terms of a credit card agreement would be deemed
to be unenforceable unless the Issuer could establish that the Holder was
(or should have been) aware and understood the significance of the
applicable terms at the time the credit card agreement was executed.
154
This may need to be established beyond reference to the credit card
agreement itself.155  For example, Issuers may need to disclose the
applicable interest rate orally when executing the credit card agreement.
Of course, Issuers also would be permitted to establish that the interest
rate was disclosed such that Holder understood it, or to lessen the impact
of a subjective standard, that a credit card holder in Holder's situation
would reasonably be expected to understand it. Issuers thus would have
to assess and address fairly the true "costs" of the credit card agreement,
either by meeting the disclosure requirements (and ensuring that Holders
are consciously and comprehendingly agreeing to the agreement's
provisions) or compensating Holders when the requirements have not
been met (by ex post interpretation of the agreement to Holder's
benefit). 156  This standard would also avoid relying on courts'
151. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 611.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1377, 1416 (suggesting that "[i]f a contracting party
misconceives the future consequences of the contract, then the normative power of contractual consent
is significantly weakened ... . Freedom of contract may thus prevent, rather than promote, the
fulfillment of the consumer's true ex ante preferences."); see also Meyerson, supra note 7, at 611-13.
Meyerson suggests that consumers give explicit consent only to central terms, such a price, in the
standard form contract, and as a result, this presumption should be reserved for subordinate clauses. In
the credit card agreement context, however, given the uncertainty of most credit card holders of their
interest rate, it is not clear why this presumption should not be extended to the interest rate (the price) as
well.
155. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 612-13 (noting that "[m]erely using a contract with plain
language and without fine print is not sufficient, even though such a contract would somewhat decrease
the consumer's information costs.")
156. Note that enforcing a particular contract for the benefit of the Holder does not suggest that
Holder would be entitled to any provision beyond her reasonable expectations. Thus, although the credit
card agreement may not be enforced to the detriment of the Holder beyond her reasonable
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determination of what was reasonable from a business perspective (as in
the traditional application of the "reasonable expectations" doctrine).
Instead, courts would make an inquiry into the adequacy of disclosure
and nothing more.
In particular, this would augment the new disclosures required for
teaser rates under the CARD Act. As noted in Part III.A, supra, Issuers
are required to inform Holders of the rate that will apply following the
expiration of the teaser period, as well as the length of the teaser period.
If the obligation is on Issuers to demonstrate, in a dispute situation, that
Holders should be expected to understand the teaser rate disclosure and
its significance. Instead of obscure or buried disclosures, Issuers would
likely find the most efficient and effective manner in which to disclose
the teaser rate terms for fear of not receiving the benefit of the increased
interest rate. 157 One can also imagine Issuers expending resources to
determine how Holders interpret different forms of notices and
explanations, which would be useful to the Issuers both for determining
the ideal form of teaser rate disclosure as well as evidence of the utility
of that form of disclosure. 158 Using evolving common law standards to
determine the adequacy of disclosure also may suggest that Issuers will
exceed any minimum disclosure requirements of the CARD Act or other
regulations, especially if compliance with the applicable regulations is
not deemed to satisfy the common law standard. 1
59
Shifting the presumption of enforceability also is important for
ancillary contract terms that Holders are especially unlikely to read or
comprehend in the typical credit card agreement. 160 If the significance
of a particular ancillary term is adequately disclosed and explained to
Holders, then Issuers should be given the benefit of that particular term.
It may be too time-consuming or cost-prohibitive, however, to explain
every ancillary provision in a credit card agreement. The question
comprehension, neither will it be interpreted to Holder's benefit beyond Holder's reasonable
expectations.
157. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 613 (suggesting that it would be "hard to imagine" a court not
enforcing a term if the significance of the terms was explained orally to the consumer).
158. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 255 ("One of the advantages of weak paternalism [such as
shifting default rules] is that it may be technology-forcing, in the sense that it can spur innovations that
respond to individual needs in ways that government may be unable to imagine.").
159. See, e.g., Anne Erikson Haffner, The Increasing Necessity of the Tort System In Effective
Drug Regulation in a Changing Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. HEALTH CARE. L. & POL'Y 365, 398 (2006)
(noting that "[u]nder the common law tort system, pharmaceutical companies are encouraged to go
beyond the minimal safety and warning requirements of the FDA because regulatory compliance does
not presume satisfaction of the standard of care"). In the lending context, lenders are insulated from
civil liability for any act in good faith that conforms to any Federal Reserve System interpretation. 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
160. See Meyerson, supra note 7, at 612-13.
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remaining, then, is how to interpret and enforce relatively minor or
ancillary terms that have not been disclosed adequately to Holders. In
the general consumer form contract, it has been argued that such
undisclosed terms may be either interpreted against the party better able
to bear the risk of loss or by using traditional contract default terms. 1
6
Because many "losses" in the credit card agreement context are revenues
to Issuers if suffered by Holders, it makes sense to use the former
approach for any term that creates a direct revenue benefit to Issuers.
For example, if a credit card agreement included a provision charging a
fee if the Holder failed to make payments on the account by wire
transfer rather than a check, then the provision should not be enforced if
it was not disclosed and explained to the Holder. This reduces the
incentive for Issuers to include hidden or unexplained ancillary terms
that have a cost to the Holder and a direct dollar-for-dollar benefit to
Issuer.
Moreover, credit card agreements and the process by which Issuers
engage Holders to explain their terms may alter Holders' perceptions of
the contract disclosures themselves. Currently, credit card agreements
may be perceived by Holders as legalistic documents designed to protect
Issuers' interests. 162 If Holders come to view the credit card agreements
as containing important and readily understandable information, then
Holders may voluntarily attempt to internalize and comprehend the
information, which may result in more appropriate borrowing levels.' 6
3
The most compelling argument against shifting the presumption of
enforceability is the administrability of such a regime. The desirability
of using a contract is the parties' certainty of how particular
contingencies will be treated. If courts ignore any clause because of
perceived efficiency concerns (in the absence of adequate disclosure) or
other noneconomic terms, then the costs of contracting may be increased
exponentially as Issuers adjust to ensure that Holders are walked
carefully through the contract execution process. 164 On the other hand,
if Issuers generally include in their credit care agreements "efficient"
161. Id. at 617.
162. See Prentice, supra note 10, at 372.
163. See Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 61, at 1565
(suggesting that forcing manufacturers to bear the risk of all product liability costs may alter consumer
perceptions of product warnings as the "handiwork of overly cautious manufacturer attorneys" and
instead provide consumers with "incentives to read, comprehend, and follow them.").
164. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 529, 545-46 (2005) ("[T]he rulemaking approach seems to have a perspective that is
better suited to managing social and economic interactions. Adjudicative bodies are apt to be persuaded
by misleading signals from individual cases' emotional content, unable to see how the resolution of the
disputes before them fits into a broader scale, and focus excessively on individual conduct rather than
social forces.").
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clauses or clauses that comport with traditional contract default rules,
then Issuers would only be required to "explain" the clauses that are the
exception.' 65 In addition, once a decision was announced with respect
to a particular means of ensuring that a Holder understood and
comprehended a particular term (and that such terms were therefore
enforceable), Issuers would have precedent for future agreements. 166
Overall, altering the presumption of enforceability of credit card
agreement with respect to pricing and cost terms incentivizes Issuers to
make better and more complete disclosure of the material terms of credit
card agreements. Although there may be a cost to Issuers to ensuring
that Holders understand the existence and significance of such terms,
these costs are hopefully offset by the reduced costs or losses suffered
by Holders as a result of such understanding.
C. Opening Up the Courts
Another way the shortcomings of the legal framework governing
credit card agreements may be addressed is through expanded or
enhanced ex post protections of credit card holders. The CARD Act
generally fails to include solutions designed to provide this type of
protection because it relies almost exclusively on existing regulatory
enforcement of the new standards.1 67 Similar to the reforms suggested
above, the goal of ex post enforcement should be not only to be
available to redress contractual breaches but also to be a factor when
Issuers prepare, execute, or contemplate breaching credit card
agreements. 168 That is, the enforcement regime ideally would serve also
as a deterrent against poor drafting or execution decisions by Issuers.
One possibility within this enforcement regime is private legal action,
and in particular, actions that aggregate the claims of many
disadvantaged consumers. 169  Permitting Holders to recover through
class actions (or class-wide arbitrations) would deter Issuer misbehavior,
especially regarding individual claims that may not be significant
165. Meyerson, supra note 7, at 621.
166. Id. at 622 (noting that after a court decision was announced, "it is available to guide future
contracting parties and reduce contract transaction costs").
167. See Part I1l.E, supra.
168. Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 167 (explaining that "soft paternalism searches for
mechanisms to improve decisionmaking without having the state assume responsibility for all
decisions.").
169. Id. at 169 (noting that "[p]otential legal representatives armed with doctrines such as
unconscionability may well provide sufficient smoothing in a market characterized by asymmetric
bargaining power and access to information."); see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 463
(arguing that "[w]hen the courts find reason to believe that market forces have failed to discipline
businesses, they intervene to protect consumers.").
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enough to induce the individual Holder to seek redress. This would
need to be accomplished by preventing binding individual arbitration
clauses from precluding class action suits, although arbitration still could
be available for individually prosecuted claims.'
7 0
The class action mechanism is specifically and uniquely designed to
provide a remedy for individual claims that may not have value after
taking into the account the cost of prosecuting such claims ("'negative
value' claims"), but which are significant when aggregated.' 71 From an
economic standpoint, even if a particular Holder's losses from an
"illegal" or "unenforceable" provision in a credit card agreement are
small, such small losses, when aggregated, may prove significant
enough to entice a plaintiffs attorney to seek redress on behalf of
similarly situated Holders.
From a social standpoint, class action suits also could effectively
serve poor Holders, Holders who are unaware of their contractual and
legal rights, and Holders who are otherwise unable to bring claims on
their own behalf. 72  As seen above, the class action may transform a
"negative value" individual claim into a claim that is worthy of redress.
Class action suits also would protect Holders who were unaware of
Issuer breaches and provide them a remedy for Issuer breaches.
1 73
Finally, class action suits would draw attention to Issuer practices that
may need to be reformed, especially with respect to "subprime"
170. See Jane J. Kim, What Consumers Can Expect As Arbitration Firms Back Away, WALL ST.
J., July 22, 2009, at A2 (reporting that President Obama's proposed Consumer Financial Protection
Agency would have the authority to ban or restrict mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer financial-
services contracts). But see Bar-Gill, supra note 4, at 1423 ("Given the institutional constraints on
common law adjudication, it may well be better to leave the regulation of credit card contracts to
legislatures and administrative agencies."). Rather than focusing on the substantive unfairness of the
agreement, such as doctrines of unconscionability or the penalty doctrine, however, this Article suggests
that courts could focus on the substantive fairness of the disclosure.
171. Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 6, at 177; see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J.
Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85 (2004).
172. See Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 171, at 82-83 (explaining the State ex. rel. Dunlap v.
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002), decision in light of the court's emphasis on the class action tool
as an effective remedy); see also Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practice
Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 1,
10-14 (2005) (discussing generally the legal and social benefits of the class action as a device to serve
poor or marginalized individuals). Although this Article focuses on the ability of the class action device
to provide legal redress for poor litigations, many of the same principles apply in the context of credit
card holders who are unaware of the significance of the provisions of their credit card agreement,
especially given the number of credit card holders in a difficult socioeconomic position.
173. See, e.g., Blank & Zacks, supra note 172, at 12 (describing how a class action lawsuit
protected Medicare recipients who had been, without their knowledge, denied services or entitlements);
Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 171, at 89 (noting that "one of the virtues of the class action is that it
requires that putative class members be notified of the potential violation of their rights").
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Holders. 174
The class action can be seen in this way as leveling the playing field
for Issuers and Holders, as any disadvantages faced by Holders when
entering a credit card agreement could be addressed at least in part by
their collective ability to seek redress after the fact. 175 The mere threat
of a class action may force Issuers to alter their behavior prospectively,
as Issuers may no longer be able to rely on the "negative value" of
individual claims or the inability of individual Holders to prosecute
claims to preclude actions for recovery and may instead fear adverse
publicity associated with a public class action lawsuit.
As a result of the threat of class action lawsuits, Issuers will either
charge Holders more via express contract or internalize the "costs" of
certain Issuer practices, such as charging fees for certain conveniences
without disclosing such fees in advance. 176  In other words, Issuers
would make a complete determination as to whether the revenue
collected from such a fee was necessary for the Issuers to provide the
service of the credit card, and Issuers would either charge Holders more
for the credit card through increased interest rates or complete disclosure
of the fees in advance, or accept less revenue by not charging the fee.
Either way, the "cost" has been properly incorporated into the
commercial relationship without detriment to the unknowing Holder.
As noted in Part III.E, supra, however, mandatory individual binding
arbitration clauses generally preclude collective or class actions with
respect to Issuer breaches. Permitting (or prohibiting) collective actions
could be achieved through a number of means. First, using the new
proposed default rule specified in Part IV.B supra, which would
presume the unenforceability of clauses in the absence of an Issuer
demonstrating that a Holder comprehended the significance of a
174. See Blank & Zacks, supra note 172, at 13 (suggesting that "class action lawsuits draw public
attention to issues that are unique to the poor community."); Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 171, at 90,
92 (noting that many important remedies only can be provided on a group-wide basis rather than through
individual claims or through government enforcement actions).
175. See Blank & Zacks, supra note 172, at 12 (arguing that "[c]lass action lawsuits also eliminate
power imbalances by allowing a class of underrepresented people with similar claims to attract more
effectively the attention of a powerful defendant."); see also Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating
Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 17 (1984) (noting that
an individual suit cannot "restore the political balance of power between the institution and the
individual. By contrast, the class suit can secure relief for the client that is not only longer-lasting but
also broader-based."). See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (suggesting that class action lawsuits
address some of the disadvantages faced by poor plaintiffs).
176. See Blank & Zacks, supra note 172, at 13 (suggesting that "[t]he class action lawsuit ... can
be viewed as a tool that requires potential defendants to internalize the costs of socially injurious
policies").
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particular clause, could be employed for arbitration clauses. 177 Another
method would be to preclude by statute or regulation any class action
waiver in the consumer credit context (even if individual arbitration
provision still were permitted). Regardless of the method of enactment,
opening up the courts to class-wide relief could be a significant tool in
addressing the imbalance in the credit card agreement context.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that the CARD Act, although providing
useful reforms, contains significant flaws regarding its attempt to
promote both the fairness and efficiency of credit card agreements. The
CARD Act's most substantial flaw is its reliance on passive information
disclosure to Holders with respect to credit card agreement default terms
or modified terms, without modifying Issuers' incentives to withhold or
conceal such information. Holders, as the recipients of such information
(often on an untimely basis), are not likely to internalize such
information, as a result of behavioral biases that prefer inaction over
action and reflect over-optimism about the likelihood of the future
application of adverse contractual provisions (such as mandatory
individual binding arbitration provisions). Issuers, on the other hand,
receive directly all of the benefits of a credit card agreement provision
that results in additional interest or fees. As opposed to the product
liability context, where externalized costs are not necessarily a benefit to
product sellers, Issuers are incentivized to develop contractual situations
where Holders are likely to face such revenue-generating "costs." The
CARD Act addresses certain egregious practices by prohibiting them or
severely restricting them, but in general it does little to alter the basic
contractual relationship between Issuers and Holders whereby Issuers
are incentivized to conceal credit card agreement terms that result in
future costs or charges to Holders. In this way, Issuers are able to
impose (externalize) improper costs on Holders, which is only
compounded by Issuers' knowledge of the likely inaction by Holders in
response to a standard form contract and accompanying disclosures
containing unfavorable terms.
Similarly, the CARD Act relies on existing regulatory enforcement to
177. At least one court has taken some steps towards this approach. In Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), the court concluded that class action waivers were unenforceable
when the waiver was obtained though "passive disclosure" (a "bill stuffer") and to the extent that such
waivers "operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses." Id. at 1008; see also Issacharoff &
Delaney, supra note 6, at 182 (discussing the "soft paternalism" approach that would permit waivers of
class action so long as "the scope of conscionability" was not exceeded by Issuer practices).
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provide redress for harms suffered by Holders. As a result, Issuers are
not prohibited from including dispute resolution clauses that require
individual mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes. These clauses
likely have diminished Holders' ability to prevent and address Issuer
misbehavior in the credit card agreement context. This result is due to
the secretive nature of arbitration hearings, which prevent the general
public (and regulators) from becoming aware of Holder complaints, as
well as the inherent conflict of interest between arbitration firms that
seek additional future dispute referrals from the Issuers while at the
same time deciding disputes between Issuers and Holders. Most
significantly, the mandatory individual arbitration clauses generally have
prevented Holders from seeking remedy as a collective group, which
probably has permitted Issuers to create Holders' costs that are
improper, as well as to diminish the number of public actions seeking
redress. Consequently, the CARD Act has left in place an enforcement
regime that does not incentivize or permit all potential interested parties
to act to deter, or recover for, Issuer misbehavior.
As a result of the above limitations of the CARD Act, Issuers are
likely to continue to draft credit card agreements in their favor,
regardless of whether the terms of such agreements are required to be
disclosed in an additional manner to Holders. The CARD Act does
introduce a useful concept that should be expanded to address the
structural flaws in the system. It requires an affirmative act by Holders
to opt-in to permit Issuers to charge an over-the-limit fee, which could
address some of the behavioral biases described in this Article, by
requiring Holders to realize the certainty that the fee will be charged
(which addresses the optimism bias) and to act in response (addressing
the status quo bias) if the fee is actually desirable. Towards that end,
Issuers would be incentivized to ensure that Holders actually opted in,
which Issuers would not be able to do without providing meaningful
disclosure that the opting in was required. Of course, if the federal rules
implementing this provision do not require opting in to be
contemporaneous with the fee charge, then the utility of this reform will
be limited. In any event, this reform highlights the type of mechanism
needed to address Holders' limitations in the contract negotiation
context and Issuers' incentives to exploit such limitations.
This Article suggests that requiring Holders to "opt in" to accept any
material changes to credit card agreement proposed by Issuers should be
required or the agreement would be terminated. Issuers would be
incentivized to provide meaningful disclosure because, absent Holder
action, the agreement would be determined, and this regime would place
the burden of overcoming Holders' status quo bias on the Issuers rather
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than Holders. Similarly, Holders' optimism bias would be addressed
because of the certainty, rather than Holders' flawed analysis of future
probability, of the unfavorable term's effectiveness. Issuers would then
have to determine whether to propose changes to the agreement based
on underwriting concerns (e.g., that the interest rate needed to be
increased because of increased or changed credit risk) as well as the risk
that the agreement would be terminated (by Holder failing to opt-in and
accept such new term). This reform would force Issuers to face the
economic decision and risks associated with proposing unfavorable
credit card agreement terms during its initial underwriting of a particular
Holder rather than relying on Holder passivity in the future if the
underwriting profile changes and Holder's unilateral changes to the
agreement are "needed."
To address Issuer incentives to provide actual meaningful disclosure
of credit card agreement terms to Holders, this Article suggests shifting
the presumption of enforceability of credit card agreements against
Issuers. Rather than assuming that all of the terms of the credit card
agreements are enforceable if a Holder used the credit card, an Issuer in
the dispute context would have to demonstrate that the disclosure of the
term seeking to be enforced was meaningful. By shifting the
presumption of enforceability, Issuers no longer would be able to rely on
a regulatory standard or on the common law's general reluctance to
examine ex ante contracting behavior. Although this regime has
obvious administrability concerns, it is intuitive that such a change
would drastically alter Issuer behavior with respect to current credit card
agreements and disclosure materials, which are (likely deliberately)
written above the comprehension level of most Holders, confusing,
complex, and disorganized. If Issuers were cognizant that credit card
agreements would only be enforced to the extent that Holders actually
comprehended the contract's provisions, then Issuers would be
motivated to determine (e.g., by conducting empirical studies) and use
the most effective disclosure methods available, or to include reasonable
default terms.
Finally, this Article has suggested that the use of mandatory
individual arbitration clauses should not be permitted, at least as a
device to avoid collective claims of Holders. Class action lawsuits
would be a useful tool to deter Issuer misbehavior by publicizing such
claims and changing Issuers' calculus with respect to improper costs
imposed on individual Holders that are unlikely to be addressed through
individual actions.
The CARD Act's inability to address the inequalities in the basic
contractual framework facing Issuers and Holders when entering into a
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credit card agreement suggests that many of its reforms will be
ineffective. Fundamentally, the CARD Act does not address the likely
passive response of Holders to additional information disclosure without
addressing the incentive or competitive requirement for Issuers to
exploit such responses. Similarly, although it prohibits several
deceptive contractual practices, the CARD Act does not create
mechanisms to prevent future similar types of Issuer misbehavior. This
Article suggests that there are several alternate or complementary
mechanisms that would realign Issuers' profit motive with the desire for
Holders to receive, comprehend, and internalize the relevant terms of the
credit card agreement. Through such realignment, credit card
agreements may come to reflect an ideal standard form contract where
the sellers, as the parties with resources, information, and profit
incentive, enable accurate consumer assessment of the risks and costs of
a consumer good.
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